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1.
This paper first makes behavioral analysis of principle parts of engineering project, then analyzes shirking problems of the two agents and some problems among principal parts based on principal-agent theory. We establish an orientation about the principal-agent relationship among principal parts according to the reality in our country. aimingto establish an effective incentive mechanism. We find it effective to stimulate the agents and prevent the agents from coalition. At last we give an example to show its use.  相似文献   

2.
Non equity Strategic Alliance is one of the middle organization forms between enterprises and the market. It is loosely coupled and agile based on the restriction and coordination by contract. Relative to Equity Strategic Alliance, it shows the agile character. But, this character causes the instability and complexity. The authors did a research of dynamic stabilization in Non-equity Strategic Alliance supported by the theories of institution equilibrium from New Institutional Economics. Presuming a control management institute M, the dynamic stabilization model of Non-equity Strategic Alliance under conditions of complete information and incomplete information is established. The author hopes to help Chinese enterprises establish Non equity Strategic Alliance was established under the changing environment.  相似文献   

3.
It remains intrinsic defect how to explain reasonable financing behaviors in classical theory of capital structure. This paper gives a capital structure decision-making model with asymmetric information and exchange cost in incomplete market, and opens out mechanism of financing-selection base on adverse selection by Chinese public companies, in more we can explain well phenomena about equity over-financing of Chinese public companies.  相似文献   

4.
姚飞  吴应珍 《中国农学通报》2015,31(13):279-283
为促进甘肃省农业保险政策的完善及提高农户对农业保险的有效需求,进而促进甘肃省农业保险的可持续发展,本研究针对农业保险市场上政府、保险公司和农户三大利益主体之间的相互影响关系,采用完全信息静态博弈理论对各个利益主体的收益进行博弈分析,同时结合甘肃省实地调研数据,选取逻辑回归分析方法提取影响农户参与农业保险的主要因素。分析得出:在保险公司和农户的博弈中,保险公司在农户有投保意愿时应当做出的积极回应为不经营策略,如果选择经营,则会损失更多(-M-P+C<0),其中,C为农户的投保金额,M为出险后农户获得的保险金,P为保险公司的经营成本;农户在保险公司做出经营策略的时候,应当积极投保,这样才能获得收益,如果保险公司选择不经营,农户无论做出什么选择,都会损失预防灾情的资金N,并且如果农户选择投保还会损失更多;在政府与保险公司的博弈中,可以看出,政府的最佳收益为0,说明政府不支持保险公司进行农业保险业务是最佳策略;而对保险公司来说,只有在政府支持的情况下,才能获得最佳收益(-M-P C Q),其中,Q表示政府对保险公司的支持成本,这说明,只有在政府支持的情况下,保险公司经营农业保险的积极性才能提高。逻辑回归分析表明文化程度、务农人数、耕地面积、农业收入占家庭收入比重、了解农业保险程度对农户农业保险购买行为具有显著的影响。  相似文献   

5.
The research theme of this paper is about how third-party logistics provider design a kind of effective incentive mechanism which can not only avoid the moral hazard behavior of the subcontractor , but also promote subcontractor to raise the serving performance constantly, until obtaining the best TPL performance .Through building bilevel programming model where constructing the Nash equilibrium model this paper, the anthors assume subcontract decision variable as endogenetic variable first, and then analyze the optimal solution with the restraint of Nash equilibrium at the time of decision variable as exogenous variable, push the subcontract relationship research at the principal-agent level into the lay that principal-agent combining with whole contract performance optimal decision.  相似文献   

6.
资本结构与公司绩效关系问题是理论界与实务界研究的热门问题,也是一个财务问题。本文以单位经济增加值来研究资本结构与绩效的关系。选取11家农业上市公司为样本,计算出资产负债率,推出单位经济增加值,对样本公司的截面数据进行线性回归和二次函数回归,并进行相关检验,最终结果说明农业上市公司资本结构存在着最优区间。  相似文献   

7.
After reform of state -owned firms mechanism, many companies appeal for ESO, but there have not been any clear theories for operation in practice until now. On the basis of principal-agent theory of the firm, this paper regards owners and managers as the two sides to game and builds the game model which analyses the behaviors of owners and managers. As a long-term stock based incentive system, ESO will align the goal of owners and managers and make them reach Nash Equilibrium to maximize their utility, and lower agency cost to solve the agency problem in modern firms.  相似文献   

8.
With the development of real estate market,the agency model will be more popular.Under asymmetry of information,both developer and agent are faced with moral hazards.In this paper,the authors analyzed the Principal-agent relationship between developers and agents,and used a principal-agent model to analyze the influencing factors for agent's moral hazards,and the influencing factors for developer's moral hazards,at last,the authors provided some ideas to solve this problem.  相似文献   

9.
The same CRM solution in same industry results in service assimilation among businesses, the cost of customer retention are rising, such strategy can not serve the purpose of saving customer cost for companies. This article introduces the new CRM solution- CKM, then analyzes the information from customer to company through the process that company dealing with consumer, and proposes a solution of the five styles CKM.  相似文献   

10.
Based on the introduction of particularity of the construction project and asymmetric information in its implementation, it shows that the project manager may have opportunism behavior, which affects the construction corporation and project manager. A principal-agent theory is applied to set up two models under different risk attitude and which proved that only if the agent were risk-neutral, the principal would get the maximum profit by leasing the project. The opportunism behavior does appear in the optimal incentive mechanism when the agent is risk-avoiding and it is harmful to the principal's benefit. The fundamental way to eliminate opportunism is enhancing the incentive intensity and enforcing outside monitoring and binding mechanism.  相似文献   

11.
Capital structure of company changes company value in a frictional market environment through cutting down cost and decreasing moral risk and causal problem in trust agency. The authors apply method of asymmetric information game to analyze how to make design of mechanism on the basis of existing revenue and cost of bankruptcy, make the company's manager maximize shareholder's wealth through maximizing own effectiveness, thus define the best radio of liabilities.The authors show that good companies have higher value than difference one in a assured mechanism, afitness capital structure could reduce the problem in trust agency of company's manager,higher risk project can bering more value for compay.  相似文献   

12.
LIU Xing  XUE Yu 《保鲜与加工》2004,(11):112-115
Taking-over market, the main component of external corporate governance, affects the performance of corporate governance significantly. Through taking-over activities between companies, the market assumes its role in the governance mechanism. This paper analyzes the taking-over market of listed company in China from the view of ownership structure. By looking into the indirect taking-over activities between companies, the authors research the impact of specific ownership structure on the effectiveness of external corporate governance deriving from such activities. It is concluded that innovation of ownership structure is the key for taking-over market to take its role in external corporate governance more effectively.  相似文献   

13.
一般认为,企业的流动资产营运能力越强,其盈利能力、成长能力就会越强。为了验证该假设,笔者以中国农业上市公司2003—2006年9月的相关数据为样本,运用多元回归模型研究了中国农业上市公司流动资产营运能力与盈利性、成长性的内在关系,发现正如所预期,农业上市公司的盈利性、成长性与存货周转率、应收账款周转率正相关。也就是说,公司的存货、应收账款周转速度越快,流动资产创造的利润就越高,其成长能力越强。从回归系数来看,存货周转率的回归系数较高,应收账款周转率的回归系数较小,说明农业上市公司在流动资产的营运管理上,应该更侧重于存货管理。在此基础上,对如何改善中国农业企业的流动资产管理提出了对策建议:农业企业应该加强对存货和应收账款的管理,努力提高其存货周转率和应收账款周转率。  相似文献   

14.
In the market economy, it is an essential problem to be solved for a company in the information process to optimize its resources and achieve the best economic profit by means of integrated management and careful planning. Planning plays the core role in the process. This paper puts forward a scheme for the design and simplification of the planning control system for small and medium-sized companies. With the combination of the two planning models, MRP II and JIT, the paper offers the framework of the planning control scheme and the designing ideas and analyzes the main functional templates in detail.  相似文献   

15.
Competition among construction companies becomes drastic while market economy is gradually established in China.It is a problem of concern that how to rationally evaluate the competitive ability of construction companies in order to plan the competitive strategy for companies.The multi index system and comprehensive index are proposed in this paper and Analytic Hierarch Process(AHP) is applied to calculate the weights of multi index.The evaluation model of competitive performance of construction companies is presented based on AHP.An example for the evaluation model is given.The results demonstrate that the model can be used to efficiently evaluate the competitive performance of construction companies.The competitive strategy can be suggested through analyzing some factors influencing the competitive performance of construction companies.  相似文献   

16.
The relationship of investors and venture capitalists is an important part in venture capital. Based on asymmetric information, this paper analyzes the principal agent relationship between investors and venture capitalists with game theory. And this paper mainly discusses the choosing, controlling and incentive problem. It suggests that only the capable and self confident venture capitalists could accept the terms of the limited partnership. It also indicates that recompense mechanism which holds the interest of investors and that of venture capitalists tightly is the center of the limited partnership. Rate of yield is the key of recompense mechanism, it not only reflects the incentive on venture capitalists, also reflects the share of risk between investors and venture capitalists. At last, the market credit play an important role in venture capital.  相似文献   

17.
This article makes a new model for stimulating personnel ,and excellently integrates the two classical incentive theory, which are Double Element Theory and Expectation Theory.The model values three important elements which can enormously stimulate the personnel,namely,the sense of achievement and challenge of job,the expectation of personnel to job,the feasibility of job itself.Then,the article also concisely illuminates the working mechanism as well as influence of the effects of personnel incentive made by these three elements.It is also indicated that the company should utilize different incentive ways for different kinds of personnel.Moreover,the article shows the correct direction of companys' personnel incentive,that is,the leader of company can primarily make use of internal incentive to stimulate personnel,while subsidiarily of external incentive.It finally advises several effective methods for personnel incentive,which has a certain guiding meaning in company management.  相似文献   

18.
Drawing on managerial interview material from a multi-industry sample, this paper sketches the locational dynamics of regional functions in the Asia Pacific. Generic factors like proximity to company affiliates and market access are discussed, along with industry specific dynamics for air delivery and online information services. The paper ends with an analysis of the inertia created by agglomeration effects of established places versus the competing pulls of new markets and production sites.  相似文献   

19.
农产品可追溯制度中农户和企业的博弈研究   总被引:2,自引:0,他引:2  
闫倩  吴秀敏 《中国农学通报》2010,26(15):426-431
近年来,农产品可追溯制度受到了广泛的关注,尤其是在农产品安全事件发生后,责任的追溯和质量保障更加受到人们重视。作为可追溯制度的源头参与者-企业和农户,其行为对整个可追溯过程有重要意义。本文运用委托--代理模型对二者在可追溯制度过程中的信任关系进行分析,得出在契约交易下,有利于可追溯制度的实施,此时企业更倾向于监督农户行为,从长远利益看农户会选择不违约。  相似文献   

20.
In this paper the features of information asymmetry and information model under the model of management by construction agency in project invested by government are analyzed, the information asymmetry in the main bodies of construction agency in the project invested by government is studied. Especially the advantages and weaknesses in information among government consignor, consuming unit and construction agency are analyzed. A dynamic model of incomplete information among government consignor, consuming unit and construction agency has been set up,a game theory analysis on the actions about the main bodies of construction agency in the project invested by government is carried out.  相似文献   

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