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1.
During the 2003-2004 epidemic in Korea, the infection time and within-farm spread pattern of virus were analysed for the highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) outbreak on chicken farms using regression models based on epidemiological data. Mortality observed on a given day had a positive linear association with time after initial infection. HPAI spread more rapidly on farms managed by employees and on farms with larger numbers of chicken houses in use. The disease spread more rapidly among layer chickens than among broilers. Using statistical model, we found that farmers recognize the abnormally high mortality resulting from HPAI approximately 5 days after infection. Without any intervention, entire flocks would die within 12 days of introduction of the HPAI virus to the infected farm.  相似文献   

2.
Typically highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) viruses spread very rapidly among chickens within sheds. However, the spread was slower than expected for the initial 10 days of the index farm in Japan during 2004. This slow spread, as well as the lack of gross lesions, clinical signs, or high mortality, hindered the field veterinarian from reporting a suspected HPAI outbreak to the veterinary office. To understand the field conditions for the slow virus spread, we examined contact and airborne transmission of the H5N1 virus to chickens in a negative-pressure isolator using various numbers of infected chickens and separate compartments. We found that the contact transmission did occur inefficiently when one or two chickens were infected, whereas the transmission was efficient when four chickens were infected. Airborne transmission of the HPAI virus was also dependent on the number of infected chickens and was less efficient than contact transmission. These data together with field observations suggested that number of infected chickens, chicken house types, and amount of environmental contamination might affect the virus transmission efficiency to chickens.  相似文献   

3.
Objective   To describe the structure of the Australian poultry industry and discuss the potential for highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) to spread between Australian poultry farms.
Procedure   High densities of poultry farms, frequent contacts between farms by service providers, the supply of live poultry markets (LPM) and the presence of free-range duck flocks in affected regions have been identified as risk factors for the spread of HPAI between flocks in outbreaks causing the death or destruction of over 1 million poultry overseas. Data on 1,594 commercial Australian chicken meat, chicken egg, duck and turkey farms were collected by a telephone questionnaire of farm managers to assess the risk of a HPAI outbreak in Australia.
Results and Discussion   Five regions of Australia had farm densities comparable to overseas regions that experienced widespread HPAI. Common service providers routinely contacted different classes and types of farms over wide geographic areas. However, no responding farms supplied LPM and the majority of duck farms did not produce free-range ducks.
Conclusion   Outbreaks of HPAI have the potential to cause serious impacts on the Australian poultry industry. The risk posted by LPM and free-range ducks is limited, but the movement of genetic stock and common service providers could spread infection between companies, industries or geographical regions. Biosecurity measures are therefore considered critical to limit the secondary spread of infection should an outbreak occur.  相似文献   

4.
Highly pathogenic avian influenza viruses (HPAIV) of H5N1 subtype are a major global threat to poultry and public health. Export of poultry products, such as chicken and duck meat, is a known source for the cross‐boundary spread of HPAI H5N1 viruses. Humans get infected with HPAI H5N1 viruses either by close contact with infected poultry or through consumption of fresh/undercooked poultry meat. Skeletal muscle is the largest soft tissue in chicken that has been shown to contain virus during systemic HPAIV infection and supports productive virus infection. However, the time between infection of a chicken with H5N1 virus and presence of virus in muscle tissue is not yet known. Further, it is also not clear whether chicken infected with low doses of H5N1 virus that cause non‐fatal subclinical infections continue to accumulate virus in skeletal muscle. We investigated the amount and duration of virus detection in skeletal muscle of chicken experimentally infected with different doses (102, 103 and 104 EID50) of a HPAI H5N1 virus. Influenza viral antigen could be detected as early as 6 hr after infection and live virus was recovered from 48 hr after infection. Notably, chicken infected with lower levels of HPAI H5N1 virus (i.e., 102 EID50) did not die acutely, but continued to accumulate high levels of H5N1 virus in skeletal muscle until 6 days post‐infection. Our data suggest that there is a potential risk of human exposure to H5N1 virus through meat from clinically healthy chicken infected with a low dose of virus. Our results highlight the need to implement rigorous monitoring systems to screen poultry meat from H5N1 endemic countries to limit the global spread of H5N1 viruses.  相似文献   

5.
OBJECTIVE: To identify risk factors associated with the spread of low pathogenicity H7N2 avian influenza (AI) virus among commercial poultry farms in western Virginia during an outbreak in 2002. DESIGN: Case-control study. PROCEDURE: Questionnaires were used to collect information about farm characteristics, biosecurity measures, and husbandry practices on 151 infected premises (128 turkey and 23 chicken farms) and 199 noninfected premises (167 turkey and 32 chicken farms). RESULTS: The most significant risk factor for AI infection was disposal of dead birds by rendering (odds ratio [OR], 73). In addition, age > or = 10 weeks (OR for birds aged 10 to 19 weeks, 4.9; OR for birds aged > or = 20 weeks, 4.3) was a significant risk factor regardless of poultry species involved. Other significant risk factors included use of nonfamily caretakers and the presence of mammalian wildlife on the farm. Factors that were not significantly associated with infection included use of various routine biosecurity measures, food and litter sources, types of domestic animals on the premises, and presence of wild birds on the premises. CONCLUSIONS AND CLINICAL RELEVANCE: Results suggest that an important factor contributing to rapid early spread of AI virus infection among commercial poultry farms during this outbreak was disposal of dead birds via rendering off-farm. Because of the highly infectious nature of AI virus and the devastating economic impact of outbreaks, poultry farmers should consider carcass disposal techniques that do not require off-farm movement, such as burial, composting, or incineration.  相似文献   

6.
An epidemic of high pathogenicity Avian Influenza (HPAI) occurred in the Netherlands in 2003. A census survey of 173 infected and 401 uninfected commercial poultry farms was carried out to identify factors associated with the introduction of the HPAI virus into poultry farms. Data on farm size, production characteristics, type of housing, presence of cattle and pigs were gathered by the National Inspection Service for Livestock and Meat from all farms included in this study. For each risk factor (RF) available for analysis, the Mantel-Haenszel odds ratio was calculated (stratified on farm size and housing type). We found an increased risk of HPAI virus introduction in layer finisher type poultry: OR = 2.05 (95% confidence interval, CI = 1.29-3.27). An explanation for this increased risk is the high number of contacts between these farms, especially via cardboard egg trays used for removal of eggs during the epidemic. Our analysis did not indicate significant differences between the infected and uninfected farms with regard to housing type, presence of cattle or pigs. Since layer finisher type farms are assumed to be at higher risk for HPAI virus introduction, more specific control measures might be applied in future outbreaks.  相似文献   

7.
With an extensive data set on visits made to control the H7N7 avian influenza epidemic in The Netherlands in 2003 we investigate the potential role of the persons involved in the control activities as vectors for disease transmission. We hypothesized that people can spread the virus on the same day mechanically, or till 10 days if they have become infected themselves. Taken into account was the estimated time of introduction of the virus into a poultry flock back-calculated from mortality data. We identified 19 visits from a person that went on the same day from an infected (source) farm to a (target) farm that was before infection and a further 197 visits were made to (target) farms that remained uninfected. Of the 19 visits, eight were made within 3 days before an infection started on the target farm. If we assume that these eight visits were the primary reason the visited farms became infected, then we can calculate an upper estimate for the probability of transmission by a person per visit of 0.037. In addition we identified visits were a person first visited an infected source farm and up to 10 days after visited a target farm that either remained uninfected or was before infection. Most visits to infected source farms were made just after infection. Animals on these farms were likely not yet symptomatic, thus escaping diagnosis. Such events may be difficult to prevent, although awareness of this possibility is already a major step towards prevention. Most of these visits involved tracing and screening and were made by a relatively small number of trained veterinarians. This makes it possible to focus training efforts specifically on these persons and make sure they stringently use the personal protective equipment and strictly follow the hygiene protocol, to protect them and prevent them from spreading the disease.  相似文献   

8.
We conducted a matched case-control study to evaluate risk factors for infection with highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) H5N1 virus in poultry farms during the epidemic of 2006-2007 in Nigeria. Epidemiologic data were collected through the use of a questionnaire from 32 case farms and 83 control farms. The frequency of investigated exposure factors was compared between case and control farms by using conditional logistic regression analysis. In the multivariable analysis, the variables for (i) receiving visitors on farm premises (odds ratio [OR]=8.32; 95% confidence interval [CI]=1.87, 36.97; P<0.01), (ii) purchased live poultry/products (OR=11.91; 95% CI=3.11-45.59; P<0.01), and (iii) farm workers live outside the premises (OR=8.98; 95% CI=1.97, 40.77; P<0.01) were identified as risk factors for HPAI in poultry farms. Improving farm hygiene and biosecurity should help reduce the risk for influenza (H5N1) infection in poultry farms in Nigeria.  相似文献   

9.
We report the methods and findings of a survey of Canadian swine producers summarizing farm-types at-risk of foreign animal disease (FAD) and the routine movement of animals, semen and workers among swine farms, as observed during a 42-day period. Of the 311 producers who returned completed questionnaires, 17% represented swine-herds with no swine or semen movement on or off the farm during the 42 days, 57% were sow herds or farrow-to-finish herds with limited movement onto the farm but movement off the farm, and 26% were swine-herds with movements on and off the farm. A substantial number of premises (>50% in some provinces) with swine also kept other animal species on the same premises. We applied the empirical movement data from the survey in a stochastic simulation model to estimate the number of herds infected and the basic regional distribution of infection that could be expected to occur if the FAD was not detected and routine movements were permitted to occur up to 42 days after infection with a FAD of a single randomly selected herd. Forty-five percent of the simulations did not involve spread beyond the index farm, whereas 34.8% involved spread among five or more farms after 42 days of routine movement.  相似文献   

10.
The aims of this study were to statistically reassess the likelihood that windborne spread of foot-and-mouth disease (FMD) virus (FMDV) occurred at the start of the UK 1967 to 1968 FMD epidemic at Oswestry, Shropshire, and to derive dose-response probability of infection curves for farms exposed to airborne FMDV. To enable this, data on all farms present in 1967 in the parishes near Oswestry were assembled. Cases were infected premises whose date of appearance of first clinical signs was within 14 days of the depopulation of the index farm. Logistic regression was used to evaluate the association between infection status and distance and direction from the index farm. The UK Met Office's NAME atmospheric dispersion model (ADM) was used to generate plumes for each day that FMDV was excreted from the index farm based on actual historical weather records from October 1967. Daily airborne FMDV exposure rates for all farms in the study area were calculated using a geographical information system. Probit analyses were used to calculate dose-response probability of infection curves to FMDV, using relative exposure rates on case and control farms. Both the logistic regression and probit analyses gave strong statistical support to the hypothesis that airborne spread occurred. There was some evidence that incubation period was inversely proportional to the exposure rate.  相似文献   

11.
A Monte Carlo simulation has been developed to describe the spread of classical swine fever virus between farms within a certain region. The data of the farms can be imported and considered individually. Transmission occurs via the infection routes direct animal and indirect person and vehicle contact, as well as by contaminated sperm and local spread. Parameters, such as incubation period and probability of detection, can be varied by the user and their impact on disease spread can be studied. The control measures stamping-out, movement control and pre-emptive slaughter in circular restriction areas as well as contact tracing can be applied and their effect on disease spread can thus be analysed. The numbers of culled and restricted farms and animals per epidemic and per day within an epidemic, the epidemic duration and the total length of restrictions per restricted farm are given. In an example, simulation runs were performed under the condition of application of all four-control measures. Because no real farm data were available, a test area was generated stochastically with a farm density of 1.3 farms/km(2). The distributions of the number of infected farms per epidemic and the epidemic length are shown.  相似文献   

12.
In 1999-2000, Italian poultry production was disrupted by an H7N1 virus subtype epidemic of highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI). The objectives of the present study were to identify risk factors for infection on poultry farms located in regions that had the highest number of outbreaks (Veneto and Lombardia) and the impact of pre-emptive culling as a complementary measure for eradicating infection. A Cox regression model that included spatial factors, such as the G index, was used. The results confirmed the relationship between risk of infection and poultry species, production type and size of farms. The effectiveness of pre-emptive culling was confirmed. An increased risk of infection was observed for poultry farms located near an infected farm and those at altitudes less than 150m above sea level. The measures for the control and eradication of AI virus infection need to consider species differences in susceptibility, the types of production and the density of poultry farms in the affected areas.  相似文献   

13.
Avian influenza outbreaks caused by a low-pathogenic H5N2 virus occurred in Japan from June to December 2005. All 41 affected farms housed layer chickens. Therefore, we conducted a case-control study targeting all commercial layer chicken farms within the movement restriction areas in Ibaraki prefecture, where most outbreaks were detected, to investigate the risk factors for the introduction of avian influenza virus (AIV). Four variables were identified as risk factors associated with the introduction of AIV by multivariate logistic regression: 'introduction of end-of-lay chickens ' (odds ratio (OR) = 36.6), 'sharing of farm equipment among farms' (OR = 29.4), 'incomplete hygiene measures of farm visitors on shoes, clothes and hands' (OR = 7.0), and 'direct distance to the nearest case farm' (0-500 m, OR = 8.6; 500-1000 m, OR = 0.8; 1000-1500 m, OR = 20.1; referenced more than 1500 m). We fully believe that strict biosecurity measures should be applied against any incursion points so as not to introduce AIV into more farms.  相似文献   

14.
OBJECTIVE: To explore whether early analysis of spatial data may result in identification of variables associated with epidemic spread of foot and mouth disease. SAMPLE POPULATION: 37 farms with infected cattle (ie, case farms) reported within the first 6 days of the 2001 Uruguayan foot-and-mouth disease epidemic. PROCEDURE: A georeferenced database was created and retrospective analysis was performed on case farm location in relation to farm density, cattle density, farm type (ie, beef vs dairy cattle production), road density, case farm distance to the nearest road, farm size, farm ownership, and day of infection. Mean or median results of 1 to 3 day versus 4 to 6 day spatial data were compared. Spatial-temporal associations were investigated by correlation analysis. RESULTS: Comparison of mean or median values between the first 3 days and days 4 to 6 of the epidemic and results of correlation analysis indicated a significant increase in road density, cattle density, and dairy cattle production and a significant decrease in farm size and case farm distance to the nearest road that developed over time. A route that linked most case farms by the shortest possible distance and also considered significantly associated variables was created. It included 86.1% of all case farms reported by 60 days into the epidemic. CONCLUSIONS AND CLINICAL RELEVANCE: Epidemic direction can be assessed on the basis of road density and other spatial variables as early as 6 days into an epidemic. Epidemic control areas may be more effectively identified if local and regional georeferenced data are considered.  相似文献   

15.
Schmallenberg disease (SBD) is an emerging disease transmitted mainly among ruminant species by biting midges of the genus Culicoides. Since the Schmallenberg virus (SBV) was first identified in Germany in late 2011, it rapidly spread to other European countries. The aims of the present study were to describe the first SBD outbreak in Spain and to assess the spread and risk factors associated with SBV infection in domestic ruminants from nearby farms during the following year. In March 2012, one malformed stillborn lamb from a sheep farm located in Cordoba province (Southern Spain) was subjected to necropsy. Pathological compatible lesions and molecular analyses confirmed the first SBV infection in Spain. Afterwards, serum samples from 505 extensively reared domestic ruminants from 29 farms were analysed using both blocking ELISA and virus neutralization test against SBV. The overall seroprevalence was 54.4% (CI95%: 50.0–58.7). Antibodies were detected in 70.6%, 46.0% and 34.8% of cattle, sheep and goats, respectively. A generalized estimating equation model indicated that the main risk factors associated with SBV infection were: species (cattle), age (adult), and absence of animal insecticide treatment. Pathological and molecular results confirmed the presence of SBV in Spain few months after it was firstly identified in Germany. The seroprevalence detected indicates a widespread circulation of SBV in nearby domestic ruminant farms one year after this first outbreak was reported in Spain. Further studies are warranted to determine the spatio-temporal trend of SBV in domestic ruminants in this country.  相似文献   

16.
为了解广西玉林市2020年规模禽场禽流感病毒感染状况,采用荧光RT-PCR方法,对广西玉林市7个县(市、区)42个规模化禽场采集的1260份禽喉/泄殖腔棉拭子样品进行了通用型禽流感病毒核酸检测(荧光PCR),并对检测为阳性的样本进行H5、H7亚型(双重荧光PCR)和H9亚型(荧光PCR)分型鉴定.结果显示:在42个规模...  相似文献   

17.
Direct bird-to-human transmission, with the production of severe respiratory disease and human mortality, is unique to the Hong Kong-origin H5N1 highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) virus, which was originally isolated from a disease outbreak in chickens. The pathobiology of the A/chicken/Hong Kong/220/97 (H5N1) (HK/220) HPAI virus was investigated in chickens, turkeys, Japanese and Bobwhite quail, guinea fowl, pheasants, and partridges, where it produced 75-100% mortality within 10 days. Depression, mucoid diarrhea, and neurologic dysfunction were common clinical manifestations of disease. Grossly, the most severe and consistent lesions included splenomegaly, pulmonary edema and congestion, and hemorrhages in enteric lymphoid areas, on serosal surfaces, and in skeletal muscle. Histologic lesions were observed in multiple organs and were characterized by exudation, hemorrhage, necrosis, inflammation, or a combination of these features. The lung, heart, brain, spleen, and adrenal glands were the most consistently affected, and viral antigen was most often detected by immunohistochemistry in the parenchyma of these organs. The pathogenesis of infection with the HK/220 HPAI virus in these species was twofold. Early mortality occurring at 1-2 days postinoculation (DPI) corresponded to severe pulmonary edema and congestion and virus localization within the vascular endothelium. Mortality occurring after 2 DPI was related to systemic biochemical imbalance, multiorgan failure, or a combination of these factors. The pathobiologic features were analogous to those experimentally induced with other HPAI viruses in domestic poultry.  相似文献   

18.
We used the movements of adult milking cows among farms enrolled in the Dairy Herd Improvement (DHI) program in Ontario to explore the size of an epidemic that might result from farm-to-farm movements of cows in the Province if a reportable long-incubation infection like tuberculosis (TB) were introduced and not detected for 1-3 years after introduction. A directed network was created for each year (2004-2006) using all pairs of individual shipments, defined as the movement of one or more cows on a single day, from a single source DHI farm to a single recipient DHI farm. A 3-year network was also developed that included all cow shipments that took place during these 3 years. The lower and upper bounds of potential maximal epidemic size were estimated using four network-analysis measures: (1) the farm out-degree, (2) the size of the largest strong and weak components, (3) the bow-tie approach, classifying farms into six different areas of a directed network and (4) the infection chain of a farm. All four of the DHI movement networks were found to be small-world, indicating that infection could spread over considerable distances by shipments that linked potentially distant clusters of farms. The networks were also scale-free, indicating most farms had relatively few connections to other farms, while there were a few highly connected farms. Characterization of the yearly networks showed that 41-47% of DHI farms were not involved in any cow shipments and were therefore not at risk of infection from this movement network; furthermore, if infection were introduced into a DHI farm that shipped animals that year, the infection would have stopped at that farm (or at least, not been passed on by shipment of adult milking cows) >50% of the time, and 75% of the time only one more DHI farm would have become infected through animal movements. Compared to the infection chain, which accounted for both the direction and the time sequence of shipments in the movement network, the other network-analysis measures provided biased estimates of potential epidemic size. The bow-tie approach provided a schematic representation of the level of risk of each farm in the network in spreading an infection, but overestimated the lower- and upper-bound measures of potential epidemic size because it did not account for the time sequence of shipments. Our infection-chain results suggest that introducing a long-incubation disease into the network of farms enrolled in the DHI program in Ontario that was not identified until 12 months after the incursion would, in a worst-case scenario, have resulted in 168 farms (representing 5% of all Ontario DHI herds) being infected as a consequence of adult cow movements among DHI farms. This estimate increased to 850 farms (26% of all DHI herds) if the infection were not identified for 36 months.  相似文献   

19.
On 23 February 1999, the Dutch Animal Health Service advised all Dutch veterinary practices to postpone vaccination against bovine herpesvirus 1 (BHV1) immediately. The day before severe disease problems were diagnosed on four dairy farms after vaccination with the same batch of BHV1 marker vaccine. Using monoclonal antibodies, bovine virus diarrhoea virus (BVDV) type 2 was found in the vaccine batch. This paper describes an outbreak of BVDV type 2 infection caused by the use of a batch of modified live BHV1 marker vaccine contaminated with BDVD. Sources of information used were reports of farm visits, minutes of meetings, laboratory results, and oral communications from the people involved. The first symptoms of disease were observed on average six days after vaccination. Morbidity was high on 11 of the 12 farms. On five farms more than 70% of the animals became ill, while on one farm no symptoms could be detected. During the first week after vaccination, feed intake and milk production decreased. During the second week, some animals became clinically diseased having nasal discharge, fever, and diarrhoea. At the end of the second week and at the start of the third week, the number of diseased animals increased rapidly, the symptoms became more severe, and some animals died. Mortality varied among herds. Necropsy most often revealed erosions and ulcers of the mucosa of the digestive tract. In addition, degeneration of the liver, hyperaemia of the abomasum, and swollen mesenterial lymph nodes and swollen spleen were found. On 11 of the 12 farms all animals were culled between 32 and 68 days after vaccination after an agreement was reached with the manufacturer of the vaccine. This was the third outbreak of BVD in cattle after administration of a contaminated vaccine in the Netherlands. The possibilities to prevent contamination of a vaccine as a consequence of infection of fetal calf serum with BVDV are discussed. Improvement of controls to prevent contamination before and during vaccine production, and improvement of the monitoring of side-effects is necessary.  相似文献   

20.
一例肾型鸡传染性支气管炎的诊断   总被引：4，自引：3，他引：1  
2007年9月,郑州某鸡场发生一起疑似肾型鸡传染性支气管炎。将分离毒株接种20日龄肉鸡,于接种后第4 d出现精神不振、拉稀,第6 d出现死亡。分离病毒可致死部分鸡胚及产生卷曲胚,但不能凝集鸡红细胞,经1 %胰酶处理后能凝集鸡红细胞。经过实验室检查结果结合流行病学调查、临床症状和剖检变化,初步诊断为肾型鸡传染性支气管炎。  相似文献   

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