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1.
After the foot-and-mouth disease (FMD) epidemic in Dumfries and Galloway in south-west Scotland in 2001, serosurveillance of sheep remaining in the 3 km radius Protection Zones around Infected Premises (IPS), and within a 10 km radius of IPS, revealed no evidence of infection. The epidemic was brought under control by a range of traditional techniques: slaughter of all animals on IPS and of veterinary-assessed Dangerous Contacts (DCS), movement restrictions, biosecurity, tracing of potential sources and spread of virus, and surveillance of At-Risk premises. Novel pre-emptive slaughter of FMD-susceptible animals on premises contiguous to IPS, and small ruminants and pigs on premises within 3 km of IPSs, commenced after the epidemic had peaked. Most of the traditional control procedures were undertaken quickly and with appropriate priority. Animals on IPS were usually slaughtered within one day of confirmation, and veterinary-assessed DCS within two days of confirmation of relevant IPS (a median of two days). The pre-emptive contiguous and 3 km culls took somewhat longer (medians of five and 17 days, respectively). IPS were most commonly identified as a result of reporting by farmers or their veterinarians (72 per cent of IPS); veterinary clinical patrols identified 16 per cent, while veterinary assessment of DCS and tracing each identified 5 per cent. No evidence of infection was found on any pre-emptively contiguously culled premises, and IPS were declared only on three 3 km cull premises. The time from estimated first lesion to end of slaughter on an IP was found, by regression analysis, to be a key component in effective control, manifested by a reduction in the estimated dissemination rate (EDR); there was little evidence that the intensity of contiguous culling affected the EDR. Patrols and serological surveillance of residual animals within 10 km of IPS, supported by more extensive evidence from elsewhere in the UK, suggested that cryptic infection in sheep was not widespread. Ultimately, there was insufficient evidence to support the effectiveness of 3 km pre-emptive culling as a control procedure.  相似文献   

2.
An analysis was made that calculated the risk of disease for premises in the most heavily affected parts of the county of Cumbria during the foot-and-mouth disease epidemic in the UK in 2001. In over half the cases the occurrence of the disease was not directly attributable to a recently infected premises being located within 1.5 km. Premises more than 1.5 km from recently infected premises faced sufficiently high infection risks that culling within a 1.5 km radius of the infected premises alone could not have prevented the progress of the epidemic. A comparison of the final outcome in two areas of the county, south Penrith and north Cumbria, indicated that focusing on controlling the potential spread of the disease over short distances by culling premises contiguous to infected premises, while the disease continued to spread over longer distances, may have resulted in excessive numbers of premises being culled. Even though the contiguous cull in south Penrith appeared to have resulted in a smaller proportion of premises becoming infected, the overall proportion of premises culled was considerably greater than in north Cumbria, where, because of staff and resource limitations, a smaller proportion of premises contiguous to infected premises was culled.  相似文献   

3.
An outbreak of foot and mouth disease (FMD) could seriously impact Australia's livestock sector and economy. As an FMD-free country, an outbreak would trigger a major disease control and eradication program that would include the culling of infected and at risk animals (‘stamping out’), movement restrictions and zoo-sanitary measures. Additional control measures may also include pre-emptive culling or vaccination. However, it is unclear what disease strategy would be most effective under Australian conditions and different resource levels. Using a stochastic simulation model that describes FMD transmission between farms in a livestock dense region of Australia, our results suggest that using current estimates of human resource capacity for surveillance, infected premises operations and vaccination, outbreaks were effectively controlled under a stamping out strategy. However, under more constrained resource allocations, ring vaccination was more likely to achieve eradication faster than stamping out or pre-emptive culling strategies.  相似文献   

4.
In recent foot and mouth disease outbreaks, many healthy animals have been culled to prevent disease transmission. Emergency vaccination is discussed as an alternative to culling of unaffected animals. A spatial and temporal Monte–Carlo simulation model was used to compare preventive culling and emergency vaccination. Different outbreaks are described using additional influence factors such as airborne spread, farm density, type of index-case farm and delay until establishment of the control strategies. The fewest farms were infected establishing a combined strategy including a 1 km preventive culling and 1–10 km emergency vaccination zone around each outbreak farm. Taking the number of culled and vaccinated farms into account, vaccination around the first diagnosed farm combined with the baseline strategy (culling of outbreak farms, protection and surveillance zone, contact tracing) is to be preferred. In the present study, emergency vaccination was an effective control strategy especially in densely populated regions.  相似文献   

5.
During the foot-and-mouth disease epidemic in the UK in 2001, two major control policies were the rapid identification of cases and the culling of animals on infected premises and on dangerous contact premises. Dangerous contact premises were divided into two groups, premises contiguous to an infected premises and non-contiguous premises. In England, the largest numbers of geographically clustered infected premises were in Cumbria, the South West (Somerset, Devon and Cornwall) and the Settle/Clitheroe area straddling the Yorkshire-Lancashire border. In each of these clusters, the rate of spread of the disease, the average time from the first lesion to slaughter on infected premises, and the intensity of culling of contiguous premises and non-contiguous premises were calculated for seven-day periods. Linear regression analysis was used to look for relationships between these factors and the rate of spread of the disease. The average time from the first lesion to slaughter had a statistically significant relationship in two of the three clusters and the intensity of culling of non-contiguous premises had a significant relationship in one. The intensity of culling of contiguous premises had no significant relationship in any of the three clusters.  相似文献   

6.
This paper presents a detailed analysis of the application of contiguous culling in Cumbria between May 1 and September 30, during the outbreak of foot-and-mouth disease in 2001. The analysis shows that the application of veterinary risk assessment and judgement identified and removed groups of susceptible stock which were at risk of direct transmission of infection and avoided infected animals being left that might have spread the disease. When compared with an automatic contiguous cull, fewer culls were made and some of these were reduced in scale, providing economies in the use of resources. The data suggest that farms contiguous to an infected premises faced a 5 per cent risk of infection by direct transmission and a 12 per cent risk of infection by indirect transmission.  相似文献   

7.
Clinical and laboratory investigations of five outbreaks of foot-and-mouth disease (FMD) were made during the early stages of the 2001 epidemic in the UK. The first outbreak, confirmed on February 20, was at an abattoir in Essex which specialised in the processing of culled sows and boars. On February 23, the disease was confirmed at a pig farm in Northumberland which held cull sows and boars fed on waste food; the findings indicated that it was the first of the five premises to be infected. The disease had probably been present since early February, and it was the most likely origin of the epidemic. The other premises investigated were a waste food-fed cull sow/boar pig unit in Essex, approximately 30 km from the abattoir, which was probably infected at the same time or before the abattoir, a sheep and cattle farm approximately 6 km from the Northumberland pig farm, which was probably infected by airborne virus from it in the period immediately before February 13, and a sheep and cattle farm in Devon which had clinical disease from February 20 and was probably infected by sheep transported from Northumberland on February 13 which arrived on February 15.  相似文献   

8.
The foot-and-mouth disease epidemic in Dumfries and Galloway in south-west Scotland comprised 177 infected premises (IPS) in 24 geographical clusters, and ran from March 1 until May 23, 2001. Initial seeding of infection was by livestock (predominantly sheep) that had passed through Longtown Market in adjacent Cumbria. Thereafter, spread within existing, and to new, clusters was associated with the movement of personnel and vehicles, with further transmission by Longtown Market contacts and across common boundaries. Sheep and cattle premises were equally affected. After the peak of the epidemic at the beginning of the third week of March, the upper possible limit of attack rates for premises contiguous to IPS, and premises within 3 km, remained around 10 per cent, with new clusters emerging more distantly. Control procedures included traditional methods of slaughter of all animals on IPS and, elsewhere, of animals considered by veterinary assessment to be Dangerous Contacts; movement restrictions; enhanced biosecurity; tracing of potential sources and spread of virus; and surveillance of premises subsequently considered at risk. These methods were supplemented by the novel pre-emptive slaughter, without veterinary assessment, of all susceptible livestock on all premises contiguous to IPS, and of small ruminants and pigs within a 3 km radius (known as the Protection Zone) around IPS. In total, approximately 80,000 cattle, 564,000 sheep, 2600 pigs and 500 goats were slaughtered, the novel methods accounting for 29 per cent of all cattle and 75 per cent of all sheep killed. Limitations of existing national databases necessitated the development of local databases to administer control procedures.  相似文献   

9.
The objective of this paper is to describe the severe epidemic of classical swine fever (CSF) in The Netherlands in 1997–1998 under a policy of non-vaccination, intensive surveillance, pre-emptive slaughter and stamping out in an area which has one of the highest pig and herd densities in Europe.

The primary outbreak was detected on 4 February 1997 on a mixed sow and finishing pig herd. A total of 429 outbreaks was observed during the epidemic, and approximately 700 000 pigs from these herds were slaughtered. Among these outbreaks were two artificial insemination centres, which resulted in a CSF-suspect declaration of 1680 pig herds (mainly located in the southern part of The Netherlands). The time between introduction of CSF virus (CSFV) into the country and diagnosis of CSF in the primary outbreak was estimated to be approximately 6 weeks. It is presumed that CSFV was spread from The Netherlands to Italy and Spain via shipment of infected piglets in the beginning of February 1997, before the establishment of a total stand-still of transportation. In June 1997, CSFV is presumed to be introduced into Belgium from The Netherlands.

Pre-emptive slaughter of herds that had been in contact with infected herds or were located in close vicinity of infected herds, was carried out around the first two outbreaks. However, this policy was not further exercised till mid-April 1997, when pre-emptive slaughter became a standard operational procedure for the rest of the epidemic. In total, 1286 pig herds were pre-emptively slaughtered. (approximately 1.1 million pigs). A total of 44 outbreaks (10%) was detected via pre-emptive slaughter.

When there were clinical signs, the observed symptoms in infected herds were mainly atypical: fever, apathy, ataxia or a combination of these signs. In 322 out of 429 outbreaks (75%), detection was bases on clinical signs observed: 32% was detected by the farmer, 25% by the veterinary practitioner, 10% of the outbreaks by tracing teams and 8% by screening teams of the veterinary authorities. In 76% of the outbreaks detected by clinical signs, the farmer reported to have seen clinical symptoms for less than 1 week before diagnosis, in 22% for 1–4 weeks before diagnosis, and in 4 herds (1%) the farmer reported to have seen clinical symptoms for more than 4 weeks before diagnosis.

Transportation lorries played a major role in the transmission of CSFV before the primary outbreak was diagnosed. It is estimated that approximately 39 herds were already infected before the first measures of the eradication campaign came into force.

After the first measures to stop the spread of CSFV had been implemented, the distribution of the most likely routes of transmission markedly changed. In most outbreaks, a neighbourhood infection was indicated.

Basically, there were two reasons for this catastrophe. Firstly, there was the extent of the period between introduction of the virus in the region and detection of the first outbreak. As a result, CSFV had opportunities to spread from one herd to another during this period. Secondly, the measures initially taken did not prove sufficient in the swine- and herd-dense region involved.  相似文献   


10.
Classical swine fever (CSF) outbreaks in domestic pig herds lead to the implementation of standard control measures according to legislative regulations. Ideal outbreak control entails the swift and efficient culling of all pigs on premises detected positive for CSF virus. Often all pig holdings around the detected cases are pre-emptively destroyed to exclude transmission into the neighbourhood. In addition to these measures, zones are defined in which surveillance and protection measures are intensified to prevent further distant disease spread. In particular, all movements are prohibited within standstill areas. Standstill also excludes the transport of fattened pigs to slaughter. Historical outbreaks provide evidence of the success of this control strategy. However, the extent to which the individual strategy elements contribute to this success is unknown. Therefore, we applied a spatially and temporally explicit epidemic model to the problem. Its rule-based formulation is tailored to a one-by-one model implementation of existing control concepts. Using a comparative model analysis the individual contributions of single measures to overall control success were revealed. From the results of the model we concluded that movement restrictions had the dominant impact on strategy performance suggesting a reversal of the current conceptual thinking. Additional measures such as pre-emptive culling only became relevant under imperfect compliance with movement restrictions. The importance of movement restrictions for the overall control success illustrates the need for explicit consideration of this measure when contingency strategies are being amended (e.g. emergency vaccination) and associated risks assessed.  相似文献   

11.
Classical swine fever (CSF) outbreaks may result in huge economic losses to countries with densely populated pig areas (DPLAs). The EU minimum control measures require depopulation of infected farms, movement restrictions, zoning and surveillance (EU Minimum strategy). Emergency vaccination is authorised for DPLAs although the EU Minimum strategy plus culling in a 1-km ring around infected premises is preferred. Nonetheless, vaccination in a 2-km ring has been found equally effective as 1-km ring culling using stochastic modelling. Alternatives control measures (e.g. antiviral agents, in particular small molecule inhibitors of the CSFV replication) are being explored. Hence, the present study was set up to simulate inter-herd CSFV spread when antiviral molecules are supplemented to pig feed in a 1-km ring around infected farms. The effectiveness of the antiviral strategy for containing CSF outbreaks was compared to six other control scenarios including the EU Minimum strategy, the EU preferred policy for DPLAs and the use of 2-km ring vaccination. The InterSpread Plus model was adapted to the 2006 Belgian pig population and outbreak simulations were performed with a fast spreading CSFV strain entering a DPLA in Belgium. Four out of the seven control strategies resulted in outbreaks that were controlled by the end of the simulation period (i.e. 365 days). The distributions of the number of infected herds and the duration of the predicted outbreaks for these four control strategies were not different. This is the first report investigating CSF outbreak containment using antiviral molecules. Although antiviral supplementation was not found to perform any better than some other conventional strategies, such as pre-emptive culling and emergency vaccination, it might be worthwhile considering it further as additional tool in a response to CSF outbreaks.  相似文献   

12.
An outbreak of foot-and-mouth disease (FMD) in Great Britain was reported on 21 February 2001, followed by an outbreak of FMD in The Netherlands a month later. This Dutch index outbreak occurred on a mixed, veal-calf/dairy-goat farm in Oene, in the central part of The Netherlands. The most-likely route of infection was the import of Irish veal-calves to this Dutch herd via an FMD-contaminated staging point in France. With hindsight, more herds seemed to be infected by the time the index outbreak was confirmed. The regular EU control measures were implemented, in combination with pre-emptive culling of herds within 1km of each outbreak. Nevertheless, more outbreaks of FMD occurred. Most of the virus infections on those farms were "neighborhood infections". Because the situation seemed out of control locally and the destruction capacity became insufficient, it was decided to implement an emergency vaccination strategy for all biungulates in a large area around Oene to stop further spread of the virus. All susceptible animals on approximately 1800 farms in this area were vaccinated. All farms subsequently were depopulated, starting from 2 weeks after vaccination. In total, 26 outbreaks were detected (the last outbreak on 22 April 2001). In total, approximately 260,000 animals were killed.  相似文献   

13.
The 2007 epidemic of equine influenza in Australia provided an opportunity to investigate the effectiveness of on-farm biosecurity measures in preventing the spread of a novel pathogen in a largely naive population. We conducted a case-control study of 200 horse premises from highly affected regions of the state of New South Wales (NSW), to investigate risk factors for the spread of equine influenza onto horse premises, specifically, non-compliance with biosecurity measures recommended to horse owners by the relevant animal health authority, the NSW Department of Primary Industries. The study was restricted to cases occurring during the first seven weeks of the epidemic, a period prior to vaccination and the relaxation of some movement restrictions. Case and control premises were selected from a laboratory testing dataset and interviews were conducted with horse owners and managers on premises between July and November 2009. The proximity of premises to the nearest infected premises was the factor most strongly associated with case status. Case premises were more likely than control premises to be within 5 km and beyond 10 km of an infected premises. Having a footbath in place on the premises before any horses were infected was associated with a nearly four-fold reduction in odds of infection (odds ratio=0.27; 95% confidence interval: 0.09, 0.83). This protective association may have reflected overall premises biosecurity standards related to the fomite transmission of equine influenza. Compliance with certain on-farm biosecurity practices seemingly prevented horses on premises in high risk areas being infected with equine influenza during the 2007 outbreak in Australia. In future outbreaks, in addition to broader disease control measures, on-farm biosecurity practices should be adopted by horse owners and managers to prevent equine influenza spread.  相似文献   

14.
In this paper, we simulate outbreaks of foot-and-mouth disease in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, USA - after the introduction of a state-wide movement ban - as they might unfold in the presence of mitigation strategies. We have adapted a model previously used to investigate FMD control policies in the UK to examine the potential for disease spread given an infection seeded in each county in Pennsylvania. The results are highly dependent upon the county of introduction and the spatial scale of transmission. Should the transmission kernel be identical to that for the UK, the epidemic impact is limited to fewer than 20 premises, regardless of the county of introduction. However, for wider kernels where infection can spread further, outbreaks seeded in or near the county with highest density of premises and animals result in large epidemics (>150 premises). Ring culling and vaccination reduce epidemic size, with the optimal radius of the rings being dependent upon the county of introduction. Should the kernel width exceed a given county-dependent threshold, ring culling is unable to control the epidemic. We find that a vaccinate-to-live policy is generally preferred to ring culling (in terms of reducing the overall number of premises culled), indicating that well-targeted control can dramatically reduce the risk of large scale outbreaks of foot-and-mouth disease occurring in Pennsylvania.  相似文献   

15.
Alternative mitigation strategies were compared during hypothetical outbreaks of foot-and-mouth disease (FMD) in the USA using a computer-simulation model. The epidemiologic and economic consequences were compared during these simulated outbreaks. Three vaccination and four slaughter strategies were studied along with two speeds of FMD virus spread among three susceptible populations of animals. The populations represented typical animal demographics in the United States.The best strategy depended on the speed of spread of FMD virus and the demographics of the susceptible population. Slaughter of herds in contact with known contagious herds was less costly than slaughtering only contagious herds. Slaughtering in 3 km rings around contagious herds was consistently more costly than other slaughter strategies. Ring vaccination in 10 km rings was judged more costly than slaughter alone in most situations. Although early ring vaccination resulted in lower government costs and duration in fast-spread scenarios, it was more costly when vaccinated animals were slaughtered with indemnity and other related slaughter costs.  相似文献   

16.
Epizootics of BT outside Africa have occurred in the Middle East, Indian subcontinent, Spain and Portugal, and the United States of America. The disease has only been eradicated from a major region once, this being Spain and Portugal in 1956-60 when it was achieved by quarantine, compulsory vaccination and slaughter of some infected animals. Because of the serious economic effect that BT would have on the Australian sheep industry the policy in this country is to attempt eradication, if at all feasible. The prospects of eradication will be greatly enhanced if the disease can be diagnosed quickly, when the outbreak is still localised. The laboratory diagnosis of BT involves inoculation of blood samples, collected from febrile animals on the suspect property, into groups of susceptible sheep in insect-proof quarters. The diagnosis would be confirmed at the reference laboratory in South Africa by serological and other identity tests. The diagnosis of an outbreak that originated in the northern cattle areas might be very difficult, because of the probable mild clinical nature of the disease in cattle. It is suggested that sentinel sheep flocks be maintained in these areas in strategic places near likely points of entry. Control measures, based on current knowledge of the epizootiology and pathogenesis of bluetongue; are discussed. The disease is transmitted by Culicoides that ingest infected blood from viraemic ruminants. Control is based on reducing the number of viraemic ruminants in the infected area, reducing the population density of Culicoides, and reducing the availability of susceptible ruminants. It is vital to prevent the movement of potentially infected ruminants to new localities. Contingent plans for the eradication of an epizootic of BT in Australia have been prepared. These call for the creation of two control zones. In the inner infected area, which extends for about five miles around known infected farms, there would be an intensive disinsection programme with aerial and ground spraying. Ruminants in the infected area would probably be slaughtered. The quarantine zone would extend for another 50 miles and in this area there would be prohibition of the movement of ruminants from farms. Regular clinical inspections and serological surveys would be carried out to detect secondary outbreaks. If control measures failed, it might be necessary to mount urgently a massive vaccination campaign to prevent disastrous losses to the Australian sheep industry. The difficulties in obtaining sufficient quantities of monovalent vaccine from overseas at short notice are discussed. Plans have been made to produce BT vaccine in Australia, in a specially designed high security laboratory, should the need arise.  相似文献   

17.
An essential objective of an effective foot-and-mouth disease (FMD) eradication campaign is to shorten the infectious period by rapidly detecting and destroying cases of disease. The purpose of our investigation was to identify factors associated with the early detection of clinical FMD during the 2001 outbreak in the United Kingdom. We performed a logistic regression analysis, using early versus late detection of disease as the outcome of interest.During the 2001 FMD outbreak in the United Kingdom, infected premises were more likely to be detected early under the following circumstances: 1) cattle (particularly dairy) were infected rather than sheep; 2) a recently confirmed infected premises was within 3 km of the new case; and 3) the case was initially reported by the farmer, rather than a Local Disease Control Centre-initiated surveillance activity (patrol, tracing, pre-emptive cull). Our findings suggest that reporting by farmers and initiatives that increase farmer education and awareness should be encouraged.  相似文献   

18.
A decision-tree was developed to support decision making on control measures during the first days after the declaration of an outbreak of foot-and-mouth disease (FMD). The objective of the tree was to minimise direct costs and export losses of FMD epidemics under several scenarios based on livestock and herd density in the outbreak region, the possibility of airborne spread, and the time between first infection and first detection. The starting point of the tree was an epidemiological model based on a deterministic susceptible–infectious–recovered approach. The effect of four control strategies on FMD dynamics was modelled. In addition to the standard control strategy of stamping out and culling of high-risk contact herds, strategies involving ring culling within 1 km of an infected herd, ring-vaccination within 1 km of an infected herd, and ring-vaccination within 3 km of an infected herd were assessed. An economic model converted outbreak and control effects of farming and processing operations into estimates of direct costs and export losses. Ring-vaccination is the economically optimal control strategy for densely populated livestock areas whereas ring culling is the economically optimal control strategy for sparsely populated livestock areas.  相似文献   

19.
In 2002 and 2003, two successive outbreaks of classical swine fever were declared in wild boar in northern France. The first was in Moselle, near the town of Thionville and the border with Luxembourg, and the second was in the northern Vosges area, near the German border. The outbreaks were investigated by serological and virological diagnosis of dead or shot animals. Hunting restrictions were applied to limit the spread of the outbreaks. The virus was detected eight times between April and July 2002 in the Thionville area, an area well delimited by natural or artificial barriers such as rivers or highways. Cooperation between the authorities concerned was good, and hunting restrictions were applied for one year. No virus was detected after July 2002 and the Thionville outbreak was officially considered over in March 2005. In the northern Vosges the situation was different, with no barriers to animal movements, continuous forest, difficulties in establishing hunting restrictions in this huge area, and the circulation of the virus in Germany close to the frontier. Virus of a different strain from that isolated in the Thionville outbreak was still being isolated in the northern Vosges in 2004, and owing to the failure of the hunting restrictions, the French health authorities decided to vaccinate wild boar.  相似文献   

20.
A national eradication programme was designed with the aim of achieving total freedom from bovine viral diarrhea virus (BVDV) infection in the Swiss cattle population. The eradication programme consisted of testing every Swiss bovine for antigen, culling virus-positive animals and applying movement restrictions. Starting in 2008, the campaign achieved the goal of reducing the proportion of newborn calves that were virus-positive from 1.8% to under 0.2% within two years (situation in September 2010). Both good data flow between the parties involved as well as speed and efficiency (e.g. concerning the application of tests, movement restrictions and slaughter) are central to the success of the programme. Since the beginning of the programme 2.85 million cattle have been tested for bovine viral diarrhea virus (BVDV). The BVD-prevalence in cattle at the individual and herd levels following the implementation of the eradication programme was assessed. Using data collected during this campaign a risk factor analysis was conducted in order to identify factors associated with the appearance of virus positive newborn calves in herds where BVD had not previously been detected; these risk factors would allow targeting of future surveillance. Herd size, early death rate (i.e. the number of animals that either die before 15 days of age or are stillborn per number of newborns per year), buying in stock, using communal summer grazing, production type, age structure and management strategy were factors associated with the appearance of new cases of infection. Testing of newborn calves for antigen will continue to be conducted until the end of 2011, this is combined with outbreak investigation of newly infected herds (consisting of re-testing dams of virus-positive calves and if necessary all cattle on or that recently left the farm). This process is done to identify infected animals that may have been missed during prior testing (false negatives), it also serves to identify other factors that may be responsible for the introduction of BVDV onto the farm. Since October 2009, testing of calves for antigen combined with outbreak investigation has led to the detection of 55 infected animals that had tested negative (presumably false negative) during previous rounds of testing.  相似文献   

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