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1.
According to the problem that the independent incentive contracts relying on one's own output,which is given out by classical principalagent theory,only can realize the second best efforts,this paper analyzes the optimal contract under horizontal monitor by which independent agents can monitor each other,and comes to the conclusion that the joint incentive contracts relying on one's own output and others' can realize the first best efforts under horizontal monitor.The independent agents can sign implicit side contracts among them by the horizontal monitor and the dynamic joint incentive contracts,in which strict team incentive compatibility contracts are taken at the first stage and individual incentive compatibility contracts are taken at the second stage,make the retaliation mechanism regulated by implicit side contracts among agents feasible and credible,and hence can realize optimal incentives. 相似文献
2.
Selecting manager by market and improving team cooperation efficiency are two basal tasks to construct an effective human resource management system of commercial bank in China,but there are the limitations the traditional methods in explaining the players' cooperation.The paper constructs a market targeting model of selecting manager of commercial bank and a game model of team cooperation based on stock option,and then the talent identification mode and team cooperation mechanism in commercial bank are established.It is concluded that talented managers is selected but talent-less is refused owing to stock option incentive mechanism,and employee and managers holding stock plan is an incentive force to whole team if residual remains of shareholder is less than half team residual remains. 相似文献
3.
This paper analyzes the industrial organization of public utility and its cause and synthetically researches government direct regulating pricing methods of public utility, mostly the static or dynamic cost mark-up pricing methods. It is indicated by the means of game theory and imperfect contract theory, under the conditions of imperfect information and the government's inferior position, It's impossible to develop the incentive mechanism to utility enterprise, makes low productivity in public utility. The inefficiency of the cost monitor and control is inevitable when the direct regulation pricing system be used. The thought of direct pricing methods is a mechanical obstruction to improve the effectiveness of public utility. It's the radical approach for the government to reform the regulation modes in order to improve the effectiveness and social surplus of public utility. 相似文献
4.
This article is established in the Max-profit for both tender and bidder,to their "Win-Win".The most concerned factors-cost,time,quality are taken as the incentive factors at the same time,and are combined in a mathematics model.By using the CPIF contract,the authors establish Stackelberg decision to incentive the both,and then optimize their both profits.Then,they introduce how to use genetic algorithms to compute the model.Finally,the model is illustrated coith an example. 相似文献
5.
休闲农业产业集群动力机制分析 总被引：4，自引：0，他引：4
发展休闲农业是调整农村产业结构、促进农村发展的有效途径,研究休闲农业产业集群动力机制对休闲农业的发展具有重要意义。为此,在对产业集群动力机制理论框架进行分析的基础上,依据系统动力学原理对休闲农业产业集群动力机制的构成主体和演变过程进行分析。得到以下结论：产业集群发展内在逻辑就是要素、动力机制和竞争优势之间的内在作用的过程。休闲农业产业集群是一个以要素禀赋、产业链、创新能力为形成基础,以市场需求为诱因,以政府培育为作用路径的良性动力循环,并在产生、成长和成熟3个阶段形成基础由静态要素需求逐渐变为动态要素需求,而诱因和路径不变的动力机制。 相似文献
6.
《保鲜与加工》2003,(10):140-142
Architecture market is a typical dynamic game market with incomplete information, in which exists three principal parts who are proprietors, supervising companies and contractors. There is a complex principal-agent relationship among them. With the analysis of the principal-agent relationship among proprietors, supervising companies and contractors, two dynamic games of incomplete information have been established and analyzed. If the proprietor only pay instant fee to supervising company, the supervising company will take weak supervise. Only with appropriate incentive way, the strong supervise can be done. Based on it, an incentive system is established to make the supervising companies and contractors work hard, to realize the given purpose of the proprietors. 相似文献
7.
In this paper a game model for the effect of corporation control on the financial contract efficiency under imperfect financial contract has been set up.With introducing the factor of control power,the factors influencing the efficiency of the financial contract are not only the efforts of investors and administrators and the welfare of the administrator but more important is the imperfectness of the financial contract,which can be used for discussion on transformation mechanism of the influence of the funding behavior. 相似文献
8.
This paper researches the behavior difference among government,banks and enterprises and how it affects soft budget constraints of enterprises and non-performing loans of banks based with dynamic game.The game model suggests that government will give banks some assistance and let them refinance enterprises,especially government has strong(incentive) to sustain SOEs in China's transitional economy.Banks will do it if the assistance from government is more than the loss from refinance enterprises.In addition the value of liquidation of enterprises and the new loans affect banks' refinancing old enterprises. 相似文献
9.
XIANG Yong~ 《保鲜与加工》2005,(6):113-116
Under the asymmetric information,the owner undertakes moral risk,which is caused by supervisor in the case of project supervision.This paper analyzes the benefit conflict while entrusting because of asymmetric information,discusses how to bring incentive and supervisory control mechanism into project supervision entrust-contract by mathematics model.Then,the design and improvement of the supervision reward in contract are discussed. 相似文献
10.
The relationship of investors and venture capitalists is an important part in venture capital. Based on asymmetric information, this paper analyzes the principal agent relationship between investors and venture capitalists with game theory. And this paper mainly discusses the choosing, controlling and incentive problem. It suggests that only the capable and self confident venture capitalists could accept the terms of the limited partnership. It also indicates that recompense mechanism which holds the interest of investors and that of venture capitalists tightly is the center of the limited partnership. Rate of yield is the key of recompense mechanism, it not only reflects the incentive on venture capitalists, also reflects the share of risk between investors and venture capitalists. At last, the market credit play an important role in venture capital. 相似文献
11.
The research theme of this paper is about how third-party logistics provider design a kind of effective incentive mechanism which can not only avoid the moral hazard behavior of the subcontractor , but also promote subcontractor to raise the serving performance constantly, until obtaining the best TPL performance .Through building bilevel programming model where constructing the Nash equilibrium model this paper, the anthors assume subcontract decision variable as endogenetic variable first, and then analyze the optimal solution with the restraint of Nash equilibrium at the time of decision variable as exogenous variable, push the subcontract relationship research at the principal-agent level into the lay that principal-agent combining with whole contract performance optimal decision. 相似文献
12.
After reform of state -owned firms mechanism, many companies appeal for ESO, but there have not been any clear theories for operation in practice until now. On the basis of principal-agent theory of the firm, this paper regards owners and managers as the two sides to game and builds the game model which analyses the behaviors of owners and managers. As a long-term stock based incentive system, ESO will align the goal of owners and managers and make them reach Nash Equilibrium to maximize their utility, and lower agency cost to solve the agency problem in modern firms. 相似文献
13.
14.
Operation of Debt to equity Swaps are thought to be a game process of conflict of interest when concerned interest groups seek furthest uses of them and dispute eminent domain of financial resources if state owned enterprise's property right configuration is not to be changed. That is to say, operation of swaps of debt to equity is one game between commercial bank and state owned enterprise firstly, and then it is another game of actualizing contract between AMC and stated owned enterprise. So the corresponding models are constructed according to game theory. The result indicates that enterprise and bank can compass an equilibrium and come to an agreement of swaps of debt equity. Nay, AMC must build up hawkish visualize to supervise and control enterprise's financial affairs and management in order to gain dividend and rights of section is bought back. 相似文献
15.
近年来国内理论界和学术界对农村土地流转（本文指农村土地承包经营权的流转。主要包括转包、出租、互换、转让、股份合作等流转形式）问题进行了大量研究,但对具有典型意义的某一地区或者村落进行全方位调查和透彻剖析的文献还相对较少。本文借助西万村的典型案例运用现代经济学的分析思想,并运用调查研究法,博弈分析法,在博弈分析的过程中发现了中介组织的突出作用,并总结出维护博弈动态均衡的运行机制,以期为中西部地区乃至全国完善农村土地流转提供借鉴和参考。 相似文献
16.
According to the high speed of aerostatic motorized spindle, the complex dynamic behavior and the unbalance incentive, dynamical model is built up on the basis of Lagrange equation. And it is includes the differential equatioan of free vibration and forced vibration.Then, the residual unbalanced inertial centrifugal force and the mechanism of unbalanced magnetic pull are analyzed. Finally, a motorized spindle rotor-gas bearings system with the highest working speed of 250 000 r/min is simulated in the way of the unbalance excitation harmonic analysis. The dynamic behavior of high-speed aerostatic motorized spindle is revealed in supercritical mode at unbalance excitation.A theoretical basis is provided for the optimization design, vibration control to the rotor system of high-speed aerostatic motorized spindle in engineering application. 相似文献
17.
加拿大应对禽流感的扑杀补偿政策及启示 总被引：2，自引：0，他引：2
自2003年以来,禽流感疫情在全球各地不断暴发,禽流感已成为国际社会共同面临的公共卫生问题。本文介绍了加拿大应对禽流感的扑杀补偿政策,尤其是其扑杀补偿的标准和补偿金额的计算方法,并从中得到改善我国禽流感扑杀补偿政策的有益启示,包括扑杀补偿政策法律化、补偿政策的激励相容性、补偿范围和标准及补偿金额的计算方法等五个方面。 相似文献
18.
This article makes a new model for stimulating personnel ,and excellently integrates the two classical incentive theory, which are Double Element Theory and Expectation Theory.The model values three important elements which can enormously stimulate the personnel,namely,the sense of achievement and challenge of job,the expectation of personnel to job,the feasibility of job itself.Then,the article also concisely illuminates the working mechanism as well as influence of the effects of personnel incentive made by these three elements.It is also indicated that the company should utilize different incentive ways for different kinds of personnel.Moreover,the article shows the correct direction of companys' personnel incentive,that is,the leader of company can primarily make use of internal incentive to stimulate personnel,while subsidiarily of external incentive.It finally advises several effective methods for personnel incentive,which has a certain guiding meaning in company management. 相似文献
19.
WANG Bing-jie GONG Xian-wen 《保鲜与加工》2004,(5):143-146
According to Coase and Alchian's definition ,the corporation is a contract consisting of variety essential factors.The essential factors of the firm can be separated into human capital and non-human capical. The owner of the factors will be confronted with rearrangement of the property rights when forming a contract. At the same time, the firm is a special contract which different from other short-term contract. Therefore, its property rights arrangement is dynamic and its surplus distribution is dynamic ,too. By analyzing the arrangement process of the property rights and surplus, the paper draws a conclusion about distribution equilibrium. 相似文献
20.
When studying on the supervision on listed company performance manipulation, the administrator's role has been emphasized increasingly. By setting up a game model, the article analyzes the performance manipulation made by the listed company's administrator. The analysis shows that the optimal performance manipulation strategy taken by the administrator is determined by the profits obtained by China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) and the prior probability of the listed company performance categories made by CSRC, while the optimal supervision strategy taken by CSRC is determined by the final profits of the listed company. Thus, it is obvious that there is a mutual guessing and influencing relationship between the listed company's administrator and CSRC. Finally, the game model constructed is further analyzed by employing it in the real cases. 相似文献