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1.
流感病毒血凝素在宿主特异性转变中的分子基础 总被引：6，自引：0，他引：6
流感病毒宿主感染谱很广,除野生鸟类外,还广泛存在于家禽、家畜、野生哺乳动物甚至海生哺乳动物和人类[1]。种系发生研究表明,感染其他物种的所有A型流感病毒都来源于野生鸟类,野生鸟类是迄今发现所有16个HA亚型和9个NA亚型流感病毒的天然宿主[2-3]在一定条件下,流感病毒可在不同物种之间发生直接或间接的相互传播。历史上流感病毒跨越种间屏障的现象屡见不鲜。例如,禽流感病毒长期以来仅在禽间存在与流行,但1918年H1N1亚型病毒导致了“西班牙人流感”;1957年,H2N2亚型病毒酿成“亚洲人流感”;1968年,H3N2亚型病毒导致“香港流感”的蔓延;1977年,H1N1亚型病毒再次导致了“俄罗斯流感”;1997年,香港发生了H5N1亚型禽流感病毒感染并致死人的事件[4];2003年底至2008年4月30日,H5N1亚型禽流感病毒再次于东南亚等国家肆虐,引发382人感染,其中241人死亡的事件。由此,流感病毒跨越种间屏障的现象引起了全球的关注。很多学者对流感病毒跨种间屏障机制的研究给予了高度重视并取得了诸多的研究进展。不同病毒的感染机制表明,当病毒在一个物种群体中经过多次感染,就会受到1次与宿主特性相关的自然选择过程... 相似文献
2.
禽流感病毒不断重排和变异导致新型流感病毒不断出现,其中有些毒株已经获得了感染哺乳动物的能力,严重危害人类公共卫生安全。近年来,对于禽流感病毒致宿主特异性和致病性的研究取得了一定进展。病毒蛋白某些氨基酸位点的突变就能够改变病毒的宿主特异性,使病毒能够跨宿主传播。而且,病毒的RNA聚合酶、NS1非结构蛋白和几种新发现的病毒蛋白都与病毒的致病性密切相关。论文阐述了禽流感病毒宿主特异性与致病性的分子基础,为禽流感跨物种传播机制研究及防控工作提供参考。 相似文献
3.
禽流感病毒和猪流感病毒——人兽共患病危险的新认识 总被引：3，自引：0，他引：3
杨得胜 《国外畜牧学(猪与禽)》2008,28(1):33-37
猪或禽的流感病毒传入人群为疾病的大范围爆发创造了条件,因而许多人担心亚洲的H5N1亚型禽流感病毒将成为下一个大范围流行的病毒。本文首先比较禽、猪和人的流感病毒在其天然宿主中的致病机理,其主要目的是评估猪和禽的流感病毒成为人兽共患病的可能性,同时还评估猪在禽流感病毒传入人的过程中可能起到的作用。猪和禽的流感病毒向人的跨物种传播已有多次报道,但所有这些病毒都缺乏在人与人之间传播的关键性能力。H5N1亚型禽流感病毒在人体内的超强毒力使其能在人肺组织中极度复制,从而使人体长时间地产生过多的细胞因子,但是有关流感病毒细胞及其组织嗜性的精确情况仍存有许多疑问。虽然猪对包括H5N1亚型病毒在内的数种禽流感亚型病毒都具有易感性,但很明显有一种防止猪感染此类病毒的重要屏障。禽流感病毒可在猪体内频繁地进行重配,但并没有证据表明,猪在1957或1968年大流行重配株的产生中或在H5N1亚型病毒或其他所有禽类病毒向人传染过程中发挥了一定的作用。本文的主要结论是,流感病毒本身的跨物种传播不足以引起人流感的大爆发,动物流感病毒必须经过显著的遗传变异(而这种变异大部分尚不为人所知)后才能使其在人群中定居。 相似文献
4.
给全球养殖禽类及产业造成巨大损失的高致病性禽流感病毒,是一种可以导致死亡的疾病。在近三十年当中,这种高致病性禽流感病毒在非洲,中国,欧洲,东南亚等地相当流行,已经形成了一定的流感区域,对当地造成相当大的威胁。虽然目前这种病毒并没有在人际之间发生传播,但是这种病毒若于人流感病毒进行新的重组,就将成为人间传播可致死的流感病毒,这会形成新的流感盛行。人类感染禽流感的主要途径分别是通过直接接触了带有禽流感病毒的禽类或者接触了含有禽流感病毒的排泄物。在经过不断变异后的禽流感很有可能冲破种属屏障,从而将危机到人类和哺乳类动物,从而在宿主和病毒等多种因素的作用下使宿主发病升至死亡。目前研究出其致病机制,并对其进行防治非常关键。 相似文献
5.
给全球养殖禽类及产业造成巨大损失的高致病性禽流感病毒，是一种可以导致死亡的疾病。在近三十年当中，这种高致病性禽流感病毒在非洲，中国，欧洲，东南亚等地相当流行，已经形成了一定的流感区域，对当地造成相当大的威胁。虽然目前这种病毒并没有在人际之间发生传播，但是这种病毒若于人流感病毒进行新的重组，就将成为人间传播可致死的流感病毒，这会形成新的流感盛行。人类感染禽流感的主要途径分别是通过直接接触了带有禽流感病毒的禽类或者接触了含有禽流感病毒的排泄物。在经过不断变异后的禽流感很有可能冲破种属屏障，从而将危机到人类和哺乳类动物，从而在宿主和病毒等多种因素的作用下使宿主发病升至死亡。目前研究出其致病机制，并对其进行防治非常关键。 相似文献
6.
流感病毒受体识别以及流感病毒跨宿主感染的分子机理 总被引：4，自引：0，他引：4
近年来禽流感病毒在亚洲流行,使家禽养殖业受到很大冲击。令人担心的是,从东南亚疫情爆发地区还报道了人类感染禽流感病毒的病例,我国湖南等省也有人类感染禽流感病毒。目前疫情虽然已经得到控制,但是H5N1亚型禽流感病毒将长期在亚洲存在。由于流感病毒的自身基因组极易产生变异和亚洲地区家禽业的养殖模式特点,禽流感病毒极有可能进化成可以跨宿主感染的新型流感毒株。本文对流感病毒的受体识别和跨宿主感染的分子机理作一综述,并讨论若出现流感大流行时的药物控制措施。 相似文献
7.
《水禽世界》2016,(3)
自1997年香港发现首例人感染H_5N_1禽流感病毒以来,不断有人禽流感病例报道,到目前为止,全球共有15个国家和地区的393人感染,其中248人死亡,死亡率63%。中国从03年至今有31人感染禽流感,其中21人死亡。因此它可能成为新一轮流感大流行的病原,引起了全球的高度关注,目前WHO对其已是3级预警。人类对流感病毒的认识既了解又不十分清楚,尤其是其致病性仍有很多不清楚的问题,这是由于流感病毒的致病性取决于病毒毒力和受感染宿主等诸因素,影响因素比较复杂之故。本文就目前H_5N_1禽流感病毒来源,跨越物种传播的机制,致病力决定因素及人间传播能力等几个关键的基础问题研究进展进行综述。 相似文献
8.
流感病毒的血凝素(HA)与宿主细胞表面糖链末端唾液酸(SA)的结合对流感病毒感染宿主起着至关重要的作用。禽流感病毒对SAα2-3Galβ糖链以及人流感病毒对SAα2-6Galβ糖链的结合特异性使跨种属传播受阻,但不同的流感病毒在猪和陆地家禽等中间宿主体内发生基因重配作用后,可使部分禽流感病毒获得适应性感染人的能力,另一方面,流感病毒自身的基因突变,尤其是受体结合部位周围的特定位点,可导致流感病毒受体结合特异性发生转变,而病毒的变异伴随着自身糖修饰和抗原表位的改变,使机体对其免疫识别结合的能力也随之发生变化。这些分子水平的改变都将对病毒相关的宿主受体结合和免疫应答反应产生影响。 相似文献
9.
（接上期）A型流感病毒及禽流感对人的感染1 概述 流感自古以来就是动物与人共患的急性高度传染性疾病。流感病毒属正黏病毒科的病毒，根据病毒核蛋白抗原的特点可分为A、B、C三型，而A型除感染动物外，还可感染人类。A型流感病毒目前已明确有15个HA（血凝素）亚型和9个NA（神经氨酸苷酶）亚型，每个A型流感毒株只有1个HA亚型和1个NA亚型组合。2 A型流感病毒的宿主及其对人的感染情况（见表1）3 哺乳动物和人感染禽流感病毒情况3．1 猪：由于猪的流感在其体内具有禽流感病毒和人流感病毒，因此，通常都把猪作为A型流感病毒的“中间宿… 相似文献
10.
《中国预防兽医学报》2020,(3)
正A型流感病毒是引起人及多种动物流感的重要病原,流感病毒的跨物种传播一直是研究的热点。猪一直被认为是人、禽、猪流感的"混合器",是促进禽流感病毒(AIV)与其它物种流感病毒发生基因重排进而引起流感大流行的重要中间宿主。已知的 相似文献
11.
12.
Evolution of avian influenza viruses 总被引：26，自引：0，他引：26
Suarez DL 《Veterinary microbiology》2000,74(1-2):15-27
Although influenza viruses can infect a wide variety of birds and mammals, the natural host of the virus is wild waterfowl, shorebirds, and gulls. When other species of animals, including chickens, turkeys, swine, horses, and humans, are infected with influenza viruses, they are considered aberrant hosts. The distinction between the normal and aberrant host is important when describing virus evolution in the different host groups. The evolutionary rate of influenza virus in the natural host reservoirs is believed to be slow, while in mammals the rate is much higher. The higher rate of evolution in mammals is thought to be a result of selective pressure on the virus to adapt to an aberrant host species. Chickens and turkey influenza virus isolates have previously and incorrectly been lumped together with wild waterfowl, gull, and shorebird influenza viruses when determining rates of evolutionary change. To determine mutational and evolutionary rates of a virus in any host species, two primary assumptions must be met: first, all isolates included in the analysis must have descended from a single introduction of the virus, and second, the outbreak must continue long enough to determine a trend. For poultry, three recent outbreaks of avian influenza meet these criteria, and the sequences of the hemagglutinin and nonstructural genes were compared. Sequences from all three outbreaks were compared to an avian influenza virus consensus sequence, which at the amino acid level is highly conserved for all the internal viral proteins. The consensus sequence also provides a common point of origin to compare all influenza viruses. The evolutionary rates determined for all three outbreaks were similar to what is observed in mammals, providing strong evidence of adaptation of influenza to the new host species, chickens and turkeys. 相似文献
13.
The epidemiology and evolution of influenza viruses in pigs 总被引：28，自引：0，他引：28
Brown IH 《Veterinary microbiology》2000,74(1-2):29-46
Pigs serve as major reservoirs of H1N1 and H3N2 influenza viruses which are endemic in pig populations world-wide and are responsible for one of the most prevalent respiratory diseases in pigs. The maintenance of these viruses in pigs and the frequent exchange of viruses between pigs and other species is facilitated directly by swine husbandry practices, which provide for a continual supply of susceptible pigs and regular contact with other species, particularly humans. The pig has been a contender for the role of intermediate host for reassortment of influenza A viruses of avian and human origin since it is the only domesticated mammalian species which is reared in abundance and is susceptible to, and allows productive replication, of avian and human influenza viruses. This can lead to the generation of new strains of influenza, some of which may be transmitted to other species including humans. This concept is supported by the detection of human-avian reassortant viruses in European pigs with some evidence for subsequent transmission to the human population. Following interspecies transmission to pigs, some influenza viruses may be extremely unstable genetically, giving rise to variants which could be conducive to the species barrier being breached a second time. Eventually, a stable lineage derived from the dominant variant may become established in pigs. Genetic drift occurs particularly in the genes encoding the external glycoproteins, but does not usually result in the same antigenic variability that occurs in the prevailing strains in the human population. Adaptation of a 'newly' transmitted influenza virus to pigs can take many years. Both human H3N2 and avian H1N1 were detected in pigs many years before they acquired the ability to spread rapidly and become associated with disease epidemics in pigs. 相似文献
14.
Scholtissek C 《Berliner und Münchener tier?rztliche Wochenschrift》2006,119(3-4):179-185
In this article the most important properties of influenza A viruses are described to understand influenza pandemics. There are at least three possibilities: (1) By reassortment between an avian and the prevailing human influenza A virus viruses with a new surface are created, against which no neutralizing antibodies are present in the human population. Such a virus can spread immediately worldwide. (2) Viruses, which have been present in the human population some time ago, reappear and infect the new generation, which has not been in contact with this virus before. (3) An avian influenza virus crosses the species barrier to humans and forms there a new stable lineage. In relation to pandemic planning, the first possibility can be more or less excluded, since the now-a-days human influenza A viruses have evolved so far away from their original source, the avian influenza viruses, that the formation of a well-growing and well-spreading reassortant is practically not possible anymore. Point two is a dangerous possibility, in that, e.g., a human H2N2 virus could reappear, which had disappeared in 1968 from the human population. The third possibility is at the moment the most dangerous situation, if, e.g., a highly neurotropic H5N1 virus from Southeast Asia crosses the species barrier to humans. An infection with such a pandemic virus presumably cannot be treated efficiently by antivirals. In such a situation only a rapid vaccination would be successful. In this respect in the last year important results have been obtained by using the reverse genetics. Meanwhile in about 50 countries there have been drawn up pandemic-preparedness plans. 相似文献
15.
Chengmin WANG Jing LUO Jing WANG Wen SU Shanshan GAO Min ZHANG Li XIE Hua DING Shelan LIU Xiaodong LIU Yu CHEN Yaxiong JIA Hongxuan HE 《Integrative zoology》2014,9(3):372-375
Outbreaks of H7N9 avian influenza in humans in 5 provinces and 2 municipalities of China have reawakened concern that avian influenza viruses may again cross species barriers to infect the human population and thereby initiate a new influenza pandemic. Evolutionary analysis shows that human H7N9 influenza viruses originated from the H9N2, H7N3 and H11N9 avian viruses, and that it is as a novel reassortment influenza virus. This article reviews current knowledge on 11 subtypes of influenza A virus from human which can cause human infections. 相似文献
16.
Van Reeth K 《Veterinary research》2007,38(2):243-260
The introduction of swine or avian influenza (AI) viruses in the human population can set the stage for a pandemic, and many fear that the Asian H5N1 AI virus will become the next pandemic virus. This article first compares the pathogenesis of avian, swine and human influenza viruses in their natural hosts. The major aim was to evaluate the zoonotic potential of swine and avian viruses, and the possible role of pigs in the transmission of AI viruses to humans. Cross-species transfers of swine and avian influenza to humans have been documented on several occasions, but all these viruses lacked the critical capacity to spread from human-to-human. The extreme virulence of H5N1 in humans has been associated with excessive virus replication in the lungs and a prolonged overproduction of cytokines by the host, but there remain many questions about the exact viral cell and tissue tropism. Though pigs are susceptible to several AI subtypes, including H5N1, there is clearly a serious barrier to infection of pigs with such viruses. AI viruses frequently undergo reassortment in pigs, but there is no proof for a role of pigs in the generation of the 1957 or 1968 pandemic reassortants, or in the transmission of H5N1 or other wholly avian viruses to humans. The major conclusion is that cross-species transmission of influenza viruses per se is insufficient to start a human influenza pandemic and that animal influenza viruses must undergo dramatic but largely unknown genetic changes to become established in the human population. 相似文献
17.
Zoonotic agents challenging the world every year afresh are influenza A viruses. In the past, human pandemics caused by influenza A viruses had been occurring periodically. Wild aquatic birds are carriers of the full variety of influenza virus A subtypes, and thus, most probably constitute the natural reservoir of all influenza A viruses. Whereas avian influenza viruses in their natural avian reservoir are generally of low pathogenicity (LPAIV), some have gained virulence by mutation after transmission and adaptation to susceptible gallinaceous poultry. Those so-called highly pathogenic avian influenza viruses (HPAIV) then cause mass die-offs in susceptible birds and lead to tremendous economical losses when poultry is affected. Besides a number of avian influenza virus subtypes that have sporadically infected mammals, the HPAIV H5N1 Asia shows strong zoonotic characteristics and it was transmitted from birds to different mammalian species including humans. Theoretically, pandemic viruses might derive directly from avian influenza viruses or arise after genetic reassortment between viruses of avian and mammalian origin. So far, HPAIV H5N1 already meets two conditions for a pandemic virus: as a new subtype it has been hitherto unseen in the human population and it has infected at least 438 people, and caused severe illness and high lethality in 262 humans to date (August 2009). The acquisition of efficient human-to-human transmission would complete the emergence of a new pandemic virus. Therefore, fighting H5N1 at its source is the prerequisite to reduce pandemic risks posed by this virus. Other influenza viruses regarded as pandemic candidates derive from subtypes H2, H7, and H9 all of which have infected humans in the past. Here, we will give a comprehensive overview on avian influenza viruses in concern to their zoonotic potential. 相似文献
18.
H9N2亚型禽流感病毒已在世界范围内的禽类中分离确认,并被证实可以传播到人类和低等哺乳类动物。对于它存在的潜在危害已经越来越多地受到关注,相关的研究也相继开展。许多遗传进化的分析为禽或猪流感可以直接感染人提供了证据,通过在人体的适应或与人流感病毒基因重组,可以形成新的病毒株,引起人类流感疫情暴发。文章提示应当密切监控H9N2亚型禽流感病毒,防止人类流感大流行。 相似文献
19.
Avian influenza viruses are highly infectious micro-organisms that primarily affect birds. Nevertheless, they have also been isolated from a number of mammals, including humans. Avian influenza virus can cause large economic losses to the poultry industry because of its high mortality. Although there are pathogenic variants with a low virulence and which generally cause only mild, if any, clinical symptoms, the subtypes H5 and H7 can mutate from a low to a highly virulent (pathogenic) virus and should be taken into consideration in eradication strategies. The primary source of infection for commercial poultry is direct and indirect contact with wild birds, with waterfowl forming a natural reservoir of the virus. Live-poultry markets, exotic birds, and ostriches also play a significant role in the epidemiology of avian influenza. The secondary transmission (i.e., between poultry farms) of avian influenza virus is attributed primarily to fomites and people. Airborne transmission is also important, and the virus can be spread by aerosol in humans. Diagnostic tests detect viral proteins and genes. Virus-specific antibodies can be traced by serological tests, with virus isolation and identification being complementary procedures. The number of outbreaks of avian influenza seems to be increasing - over the last 5 years outbreaks have been reported in Italy, Hong Kong, Chile, the Netherlands, South Korea, Vietnam, Japan, Thailand, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, China, Pakistan, United States of America, Canada, South Africa, and Malaysia. Moreover, a growing number of human cases of avian influenza, in some cases fatal, have paralleled the outbreaks in commercial poultry. There is great concern about the possibility that a new virus subtype with pandemic potential could emerge from these outbreaks. From the perspective of human health, it is essential to eradicate the virus from poultry; however, the large number of small-holdings with poultry, the lack of control experience and resources, and the international scale of transmission and infection make rapid control and long-term prevention of recurrence extremely difficult. In the Western world, the renewed interest in free-range housing carries a threat for future outbreaks. The growing ethical objections to the largescale culling of birds require a different approach to the eradication of avian influenza. 相似文献
20.
This paper describes the first threats of H5N1 avian influenza outbreaks in Egypt recorded from February to December 2006 in commercial and domestic poultry from different species and summarizes the major characteristics of the outbreak. There were 1024 cases from different poultry species (rural and commercial chickens of different breeding types, turkeys, ducks, geese, and quail) either in commercial breeding or in backyards from different locations in Egypt. All tested positive for the H5N1 subtype. From these cases only 12 avian influenza A viruses were isolated and characterized from samples collected during outbreaks. All isolates were characterized, and the data confirmed that the isolated viruses belong to highly pathogenic avian influenza of subtype H5N1. Full hemagglutinin (HA) gene (segment 4) sequencing was also done, and the sequences of these isolates were compared with other strains from Russia, Africa, and the Middle East. The data revealed that all Egyptian strains were very closely related and belonging to subclade 2.2 of the H5N1 virus of Eurasian origin, the same one circulating in the Middle East region and introduced into Africa at the beginning of 2006. This study showed evidence of the wide spread of H5N1 virus infection in domestic poultry in Egypt within a short time. The most obvious features of these outbreaks were severe clinical signs and high mortalities as well as very rapid and widespread occurrence within the country in a very short time. The possible causes of its rapid spread and prospects of disease control are discussed. 相似文献