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供地政策的博弈论分析
引用本文:刘胜,张安明,王春霞.供地政策的博弈论分析[J].安徽农业科学,2006,34(15):3853-3855.
作者姓名:刘胜  张安明  王春霞
作者单位:西南大学资源环境科学学院,重庆,400715
摘    要:目前,有些地方政府为了争得投资项目,竞相出台各种优惠的供地政策,特别是降低供地价格,这不仅带来了直接的土地收益损失,还引发了一系列不可忽视的问题。从经济学中的博弈论入手,分析地方政府在这种竞争性供地政策上进行博弈的重点、类型和过程,以及带来的问题,并提出破解这种由“个体理性”导致的“集体非理性”的策略。

关 键 词:博弈论  供地政策  非合作博弈  不完全信息博弈  集体非理性
文章编号:0517-6611(2006)15-3853-03
收稿时间:05 8 2006 12:00AM
修稿时间:2006-05-08

Analysis of Policy of Land Supplement
LIU Sheag et al.Analysis of Policy of Land Supplement[J].Journal of Anhui Agricultural Sciences,2006,34(15):3853-3855.
Authors:LIU Sheag
Institution:Reource and Environment College, Southwest Univerity,Chongqing 400715
Abstract:In order to obtain investment project,some local governments present all kinds of land supply policy to give privilege to the land user,especially for the price of land.Such things have brought not only the direct loss of land profit,but also a serial problems that cannot be ignored.By applying the game theory of economy,in this paper the author analyzed the key point,style,process and the problems in competitive land supply policy,and put forward some suggestion to resolve such "collective irrationality" which was brought by "individual rationality".
Keywords:Game theory  Land supply policy  Non-cooperative games  Incompletely information games  Collective irrationality
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