| 建筑节能监管体系中消费者与房地产开发商之间诚信博弈模型 |
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| 引用本文： | 邓建英,兰秋军.建筑节能监管体系中消费者与房地产开发商之间诚信博弈模型[J].湖南农业大学学报(自然科学版),2014(3):66-69. |
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| 作者姓名： | 邓建英 兰秋军 |
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| 作者单位： | (湘潭大学 数学与计算科学学院，湖南 湘潭 411105) |
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| 摘 要： | 本文考虑由单个占优的零售商和单个供应商组成的二级供应链模型.在价格相依的随机需求下，研究分散系统下的批发价格合同与两部定价合同.在一定的条件下得到两种合同中供应链成员的最优决策和利润以及供应链系统的利润.分析表明，当零售商占优时两部定价合同比批发价格合同更有效.这在一定程度上说明当前零售业中收取通道费的合理性.
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| 关 键 词： | 供应链管理 零售商占优 两部定价合同 通道费 |
An Honesty Game Model Between Consumers and Property Developers in the Regulatory System of Energy-efficient Building |
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| DENG Jian-ying,LAN Qiu-jun.An Honesty Game Model Between Consumers and Property Developers in the Regulatory System of Energy-efficient Building[J].Journal of Hunan Agricultural University,2014(3):66-69. |
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| Authors: | DENG Jian-ying LAN Qiu-jun |
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| Institution: | (School of Business Administration,Hunan University,Changsha410082,China) |
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| Abstract: | In the process of implementing policies for energy-efficient building, consumers'' decisions on whether selecting energy-efficient building start a signalling game with property developers. With that mechanism, the game model is constructed to analyze honesty and dishonesty. In the model, developers move first, and then consumers follow up, which generates three equilibria of the incomplete information game: the separating equilibrium, the pooling equilibrium and the semi-separating equilibrium. With the solution to and its economic explanations for the model, this paper advocates that developers should intensify their publicity and promotion with integrity to communicate to the public the information of their energy-efficient buildings to guide consumers in their decisions, and thus promote the development of the market of energy-efficient buildings. |
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| Keywords: | supply chain management dominant retailer two part tariffs contract slotting allowances |
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