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电商平台与消费者隐私信息保护的演化博弈研究
引用本文:王丘.电商平台与消费者隐私信息保护的演化博弈研究[J].安徽农业大学学报,2020,29(5):45-52,112.
作者姓名:王丘
作者单位:安徽农业大学 经济管理学院, 安徽 合肥 230036
基金项目:安徽教育厅重点项目"安徽省现代农业产业链信息整合能力研究"(SK2017A0142)
摘    要:基于委托-代理理论激励框架,构建电商平台与消费者隐私信息保护演化博弈模型,并通过Vensim PLE软件建立系统动力学模型进行模拟仿真。研究表明,在正常收益、成本与风险预期稳定的前提下,局中人是否选择隐私保护策略与额外收益以及承诺成本呈正相关,而与搭便车收益呈负相关。因此,提高具有激励效用的额外收益,应用承诺保障协议降低承诺成本,防范搭便车行为等措施对电商平台及消费者选择隐私信息保护策略具有积极作用。

关 键 词:电商平台  消费者  隐私保护  演化博弈
收稿时间:2020/4/22 0:00:00

A Study of Evolutionary Game between E-commerce Platforms and Consumer Privacy Protection
WANG Qiu.A Study of Evolutionary Game between E-commerce Platforms and Consumer Privacy Protection[J].Journal of Anhui Agricultural University,2020,29(5):45-52,112.
Authors:WANG Qiu
Institution:School of Economics and Management, Anhui Agricultural University, Hefei 230036, China
Abstract:This paper establishes the evolutionary game model of E-commerce platforms and consumer privacy protection based on the incentive framework of principal-agent theory, and establishes the system dynamics model with the software Vensim PLE for simulation. The results show that under the premise of stable expectation of normal income, cost and risk, whether players adopt the consumer privacy protection is positively correlated to their additional income and commitment cost, but negatively correlated to free-riding income. Therefore, measures such as improving the additional income with incentive effect, reducing the commitment cost through guarantee agreement and preventing the free riding behavior, have positive effects on the adoption of privacy protection for both e-commerce platforms and consumers.
Keywords:E-commerce platforms  consumers  privacy protection  evolutionary game
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