| 农机打假问题的三方博弈分析 |
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| 引用本文： | 徐江,刘应宗,刘宣.农机打假问题的三方博弈分析[J].中国农机化,2007(1):22-25. |
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| 作者姓名： | 徐江 刘应宗 刘宣 |
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| 作者单位： | 1. 天津大学管理学院,300072,天津市
2. 郑州航空工业管理学院,450015,郑州市 |
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| 摘 要： | 农机造假是一个严重的社会经济问题。本文从博弈论和制度经济学角度,探讨了农机打假领域中政府与农机打假部门之间的委托-代理、农机打假部门与农机造假者之间的管制-被管制的博弈关系,并相应构建了两个博弈模型。根据博弈模型的均衡解,着重分析了政府监督成本、农机打假寻租概率、农机造假概率的构成因素以及三者之间的相互作用。最后,提出了政府治理农机造假的策略建议。
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| 关 键 词： | 农机打假 委托-代理 寻租 动态博弈 |
| 文章编号： | 1006-7205（2007）01-0022-03 |
| 收稿时间： | 2006-01-12 |
| 修稿时间： | 2006年1月12日 |
Three-side Game Analysis of Fighting against Agricultural Machinery Forgers |
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| XU Jiang,LIU Ying-zong,LIU Xuan.Three-side Game Analysis of Fighting against Agricultural Machinery Forgers[J].Chinese Agricul Tural Mechanization,2007(1):22-25. |
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| Authors: | XU Jiang LIU Ying-zong LIU Xuan |
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| Institution: | Tianjin University, Tianjin, 300072, China |
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| Abstract: | In our agricultural machinery, there is a serious social and economical problem which is machinery forging. Based on game theory and institutional economics, counterfeit and inferior agricultural machinery goods are discussed in the paper. The relationship of principal-agent between government and department for fighting against agricultural machinery forgers and of controlling- controlled between the department and agricultural machinery forgers in the game are analyzed respectively. Accordingly, two game models are established. As an emphasis, the structure and mutual effect of the three sides, such as supervising cost of government, rent-seeking probability of the department and probability of forging are analyzed by game equilibrium solutions. In the end, some suggestions for government are put forwarded. |
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| Keywords: | fighting against agricultural machinery forgers principal-agent rent-seeking dynamic game |
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