| 我国粮食最低收购价政策的效应及最低价预测 |
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| 引用本文： | 黄剑桥,王利平,甘丽蓉,袁留闯.我国粮食最低收购价政策的效应及最低价预测[J].湖南农业大学学报(自然科学版),2016(4):105-110. |
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| 作者姓名： | 黄剑桥 王利平 甘丽蓉 袁留闯 |
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| 作者单位： | （中南大学 商学院，湖南 长沙410083） |
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| 摘 要： | 以2011~2014年我国A股上市公司为研究样本，基于薪酬辩护的视角，考察管理层权力对薪酬—业绩敏感性的影响以及产品市场竞争的监督约束作用。实证结果表明，企业高管利用手中权力获取超额薪酬、谋取私利的同时，会通过提升薪酬—业绩敏感性为自身薪酬进行辩护，形成薪酬契约合理有效的表象；产品市场竞争能够显著抑制企业高管的薪酬辩护行为，降低管理层权力对薪酬契约的影响和扭曲。
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| 关 键 词： | 管理层权力 超额薪酬 薪酬—业绩敏感性 薪酬辩护 产品市场竞争 |
Product Market Competition, Managerial Power and Compensation Justification |
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| HUANG Jian-qiao,WANG Li-ping,GAN Li-rong,YUAN Liu-chuang.Product Market Competition, Managerial Power and Compensation Justification[J].Journal of Hunan Agricultural University,2016(4):105-110. |
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| Authors: | HUANG Jian-qiao WANG Li-ping GAN Li-rong YUAN Liu-chuang |
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| Institution: | (Business School, Central South University, Changsha410083, China) |
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| Abstract: | Based on the samples of listed companies in China from 2011 to 2014, this paper investigates the impact of managerial power on pay for performance sensitivity and the impact of supervision under product market competition from the perspective of compensation justification. The main empirical results indicate that when corporate top managers use their power to get excess compensation and seek their own interests, they will also increase the pay for performance sensitivity to justify the reasonability of compensation, and present a reasonable and effective compensation contract. Product market competition can inhibit top managers'' behavior of compensation justification significantly, and then reduce the impact and distortion on compensation contract under managerial power. |
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| Keywords: | Managerial power Excess compensation Pay for performance sensitivity Compensation justification Product market competition |
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