| Imperfect Competition and Common Resource Exploitation—An Analysis of Renewable Resource Management with Non—use Values |
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| 作者姓名： | XIAOLi |
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| 作者单位： | DepartmentofEconomicsCentralChinaNormalUniversityWuhan430079,Hubei,P.R.China |
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| 摘 要： | This article analyzes the importance of non-use values in the management of natural resources with a model of imperfect competition.By constucting a framework of duopolistic exploiters.the incorporation of non-use values based on self-interest and altruistic motives appears to be significant for determining the degree of inefficiency caused by the problem of common property at the non-cooperative Nash equilibrium.It is found that when the non-use value placed by the altruist exploiter is bounded by that placed by the pure selfinterest exploiter,the effect of market power is dominated by the effect of common exploitation.In this case,the exploiters‘ harvesting strategy will response in the same direction to the change of each other‘s harvesting at the non-cooperative Nash equilibrium.In contrast,when the non-use value placed by the altruist is substantially larger or smaller than that placed by the self-interest exploiter,one exploiter‘s increase in harvesting will lead to a decrease in harvesting of the other exploiter at the non-cooperative Nash equilibrium.
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| 关 键 词： | 不完全竞争 资源开发 可再生资源管理 价值 过度开发 |
Imperfect Competition and Common Resource Exploitation--An Analysis of Renewable Resource Management with Non-use Values |
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| XIAOLi.Imperfect Competition and Common Resource Exploitation--An Analysis of Renewable Resource Management with Non-use Values[J].Journal of Northeast Agricultural University,2001,8(2):139-151. |
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| Authors: | XIAO Li |
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| Abstract: | This article analyzes the importance of non use values in the management of natural resources with a model of imperfect competition.By constucting a framework of duopolistic exploiters,the incorporation of non use values based on self interest and altruistic motives appears to be significant for determining the degree of inefficiency caused by the problem of common property at the non cooperative Nash equilibrium.It is found that when the non use value placed by the altruist exploiter is bounded by that placed by the pure self interest exploiter,the effect of market power is dominated by the effect of common exploitation.In this case,the exploiters' harvesting strategy will response in the same direction to the change of each other's harvesting at the non cooperative Nash equilibrium.In contrast,when the non use value placed by the altruist is substantially larger or smaller than that placed by the self interest exploiter,one exploiter's increase in harvesting will lead to a decrease in harvesting of the other exploiter at the non cooperative Nash equilibrium. |
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| Keywords: | Altruism common resource exploitation imperfect competition non use valuse over explotation |
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