| 农村饮水安全治理中的博弈分析与 |
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| 引用本文： | 李伯华,刘传明,曾菊新.农村饮水安全治理中的博弈分析与[J].中国农村水利水电,2007,0(10):49-53. |
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| 作者姓名： | 李伯华 刘传明 曾菊新 |
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| 作者单位： | 华中师范大学城市与环境科学学院,武汉,430079 |
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| 摘 要： | 以江汉平原农村饮水安全为例，运用完全信息静态博弈的理论与方法，分析了在农村饮水安全治理中，个体理性与集体理性的博弈特征，治理策略是将用水者进行多元化的组织管理，将独立个体纳入不同的组织，减少了个体单独行动的范围和概率，增加了单独行动的成本，使个体理性逐步回归于集体理性。并从委托—代理的角度分析了中央政府、地方政府和企业三者的博弈特征，提出了建设信息化网络、加强民主监督和加大惩罚等相关对策。
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| 关 键 词： | 农村饮水安全 博弈分析 策略 |
| 文章编号： | 1007-2284（2007）10-0049-05 |
| 修稿时间： | 2007-06-06 |
The Game Analysis and Strategic Study on Rural Portable Water Safety Control |
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| LI Bo-hua,LIU Chuan-ming,ZENG Ju-xin.The Game Analysis and Strategic Study on Rural Portable Water Safety Control[J].China Rural Water and Hydropower,2007,0(10):49-53. |
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| Authors: | LI Bo-hua LIU Chuan-ming ZENG Ju-xin |
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| Institution: | College of Urban and Environmental Sciences,Huazhong Normal University,Wuhan 430079,China |
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| Abstract: | Take the rural portable water safety of the Jianghan plain as an example,the game characteristics of individual rationality and collective rationality in the process of rural portable water safety control are analyzed by using the theory and methods of complete information static game theory.The strategy of governing is multi-element organizational management of water users.By incorporating individuals into different organizations,the scope and probability of individual's behavior is decreased,and the cost of individual is increased.Gradually,individual rationality turns to collective rationality.The paper also analyzes the game characteristics of central government,local government and firms from the principal-agent perspective,and points out the related solutions to construct information network,reinforce democratic monitoring and punish enlarging,etc. |
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| Keywords: | rural portable water safety game analysis strategy |
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