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| 政府与企业实施逆向物流的动态博弈分析 | |
| 引用本文： | 李金勇,刘威,程国平.政府与企业实施逆向物流的动态博弈分析[J].中国农机化,2007(6):24-27. |
| 作者姓名： | 李金勇 刘威 程国平 |
| 作者单位： | 1. 天津大学管理学院,300072,天津市 2. 河南工业大学管理学院,450052,郑州市 3. 郑州市物价局,450007 |
| 摘 要： | 随着可持续发展意识的增强,逆向物流作为解决环境与资源问题的一种有效手段,在经济活动中的地位日益重要。本文从政府监管的角度,根据双方行动的先后顺序,运用博弈理论构建了逆向物流的动态博弈模型。对逆向物流实施过程中的政府与企业行为进行分析,分别研究了折现系数和社会损失系数两个因子对博弈主体决策行为的影响,并求出相应的博弈均衡解。认为政府应根据两个因子的取值范围而制定相应的政策,不仅要加大惩处力度,还要建立基于政府责任损失的机制。最后,在上述内在机理研究基础上,对企业与政府的基本策略进行了初步探讨。 |
| 关 键 词： | 逆向物流 政府监管 企业行为 动态博弈分析 |
| 文章编号： | 1006-7205（2007）06-0024-04 |
| 收稿时间： | 2006-12-22 |
| 修稿时间： | 2006年12月22 |
Dynamic Game Analysis about Reverse Logistics between Government and Enterprise |
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| LI Jin-yong,LIU Wei,CHENG Guo-ping.Dynamic Game Analysis about Reverse Logistics between Government and Enterprise[J].Chinese Agricul Tural Mechanization,2007(6):24-27. | |
| Authors: | LI Jin-yong LIU Wei CHENG Guo-ping |
| Abstract: | With the awareness of sustainable development, reverse logistics is a effective method solve the question between environment and resources, plays a more and more important role during the development of social economy. From the government supervision's angle, it is analyzed by using the game theory. According to the action order, the paper builds up dynamic game models of reverse logistics. It analyzes the behavior of government and enterprise during the cause of reverse logistics. The discount factors and social loss factors which affect the two parts' behavior are discussed separately in game models, and their equilibrium solutions are deduced. It is believed that government should build up countermeasures according to the range of factors. Furthermore government should increase the punishment, and on the basis of responsibility loss mechanism need to be introduced. At last, based on the inner mechanisms research, the article attempts to find out the basic measures. |
| Keywords: | reverse logistics government supervision enterprise behavior dynamic game analysis |
| 本文献已被 CNKI 维普 万方数据 等数据库收录！ | |